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EAGER TO FOLLOW: METHODOLOGICAL 
PRECEDENT IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION* 
AARON-ANDREW P. BRUHL** 
An important recent development in the field of statutory interpretation is the 
emergence of a movement calling for “methodological precedent”—a regime 
under which courts give precedential effect to interpretive methodology. In such 
a system, a case would establish not only what a particular statute means but 
could also establish binding rules of methodology—which tools are valid, in what 
order, and so on. The movement for methodological precedent has attracted 
sharp criticism on normative grounds. But both sides of the normative debate 
agree on the premise that the federal courts generally do not give precedential 
effect to interpretive methodology today. 
This Article shows that both sides have misapprehended the current state of 
affairs. The federal courts already display a substantial amount of 
methodological precedent. Commentators have underestimated its prevalence for 
a few reasons, some conceptual and some empirical. On the conceptual side, 
scholars are rarely explicit about what they believe methodological precedent 
entails, and some of their implicit criteria are incorrect. On the empirical side, 
commentators focus too much on the Supreme Court and a few of its fiercest 
methodological battles rather than viewing the federal judiciary as a whole. If 
one applies the right criteria and expands the field of view, one sees that we 
already have a federal interpretive system that is at least semi-precedential. 
Methodological precedent is most prominent in the lower courts, but there is 
unappreciated evidence of it in the Supreme Court as well. And there is reason 
to expect that methodological precedent will grow over time. 
Adopting a proper understanding of methodological precedent’s nature and 
extent has some implications for the normative debate over expanding the role 
of precedent in interpretive methodology. Some of the implications should 
hearten the proponents of methodological precedent. But the fact that the current 
level of methodological precedent has not received its proper due may show that 
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its proponents’ real aims are unlikely to be satisfied even as methodological 
precedent expands and solidifies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose the Supreme Court decides that the term “vehicle” in a particular 
federal statute does not include bicycles. As part of the reasoning leading to its 
conclusion, the Court states that one canon of interpretation takes priority over 
another, that a different canon of interpretation does not apply to statutes of 
this sort at all, and that presidential signing statements may be used to resolve 
textual ambiguities. 
Which aspects of the decision have the force of precedent? That is, which 
aspects of the case must the lower courts follow absolutely and must the 
Supreme Court itself follow, under the doctrine of stare decisis, unless the 
stringent criteria for overruling precedent are satisfied? Everyone would agree 
that precedential effect attaches at least to the conclusion that a bicycle is not a 
“vehicle” for purposes of the particular statute. But what is the future effect of 
the methodological rulings that accompany the substantive holding, such as the 
pronouncement about the relative priority of two canons? Do those kinds of 
rulings enjoy precedential status in future cases? 
The conventional view within the field of statutory interpretation is that 
propositions of interpretive methodology generally do not, as a descriptive 
matter, enjoy precedential status in the federal courts. 1  That is, the courts 
 
 1. See, e.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation 
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1872–74 (2008) (explaining that the Supreme Court does not give 
decisions about interpretive methodology ordinary binding effect); Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal 
Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 757 
(2013) (stating that the idea of stare decisis for rules of interpretation “has been rejected by all federal 
courts and most scholars”); id. at 777 (observing “the absence of any kind of system of precedent for 
statutory interpretation methodology” in the federal courts); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories 
of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 
1754 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] (“Methodological stare decisis—the practice of giving 
precedential effect to judicial statements about methodology—is generally absent from the 
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regard a case as settling a particular substantive question—such as whether a 
bicycle is a “vehicle” within the meaning of a certain statute—but the courts do 
not regard a case as settling various questions of interpretive methodology that 
arise along the way, no matter how central to the result. 
One of the most interesting developments in the last decade or so of 
legislation scholarship has been the emergence of a movement calling on the 
federal courts to reverse the state of affairs just described and to give 
precedential effect to methodological rulings. 2  Under a regime of 
methodological precedent (or “MP,” for short), a case deciding whether a 
bicycle is a vehicle could authoritatively settle methodological matters such as 
the scope of a canon’s application, the relative priority of two conflicting canons, 
or the permissible uses of legislative history. The movement for MP draws 
inspiration from the example of certain state supreme courts that have self-
consciously attempted to establish binding interpretive regimes.3 The hope of 
MP advocates is that making interpretive methodology into binding law will 
reduce the much lamented unpredictability of statutory interpretation.4 
 
jurisprudence of mainstream federal statutory interpretation . . . .”); Stephen M. Rich, A Matter of 
Perspective: Textualism, Stare Decisis, and Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1197, 1197 (2014) (“When the Supreme Court rules on matters of statutory interpretation, it does not 
establish ‘methodological precedents.’ The Court is not bound to follow interpretive practices 
employed in a prior case even if successive cases concern the same statute.” (footnote omitted)); 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2144 
(2002) (“[T]he Justices do not seem to treat methodology as part of the holding of case law.”); Jonathan 
R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 
385–86, 389 (2005) [hereinafter Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle] (observing that “stare decisis effect 
attaches to the interpretation that the Court gives to a statute, but the Court does not adhere to the 
interpretive methods used to reach that interpretation” and that “stare decisis effect attaches to the 
ultimate holding as to the meaning of the particular statute interpreted, but not to general 
methodological pronouncements”); see also James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Protean Statutory 
Interpretation in the Courts of Appeals, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681, 690–93 (2017) (describing the 
limited role of Supreme Court precedent in guiding lower-court methodology); cf. WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW 145–46 (2016) (“The Court does not accord formal stare decisis 
effect to its methodological precedents. . . . [But] those precedents have a quasi-stare decisis authority, 
not formally binding but weighty nonetheless.”); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1976 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, Interpretive-Regime] (stating that methodological 
statements are technically dicta and therefore “not binding on the Supreme Court or even on lower 
courts”—but that the statements are nonetheless practically influential). 
 2. E.g., Foster, supra note 1, at 1884; Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 1, at 1848–55; Abbe R. Gluck, 
Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2057 (2017); Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions 
Alike: The Scope of Stare Decisis as Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 708 (2008); 
see also Matthew Mezger, Using Interpretive Methodology To Get out from Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, 
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1335, 1351, 1353 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court should impose a 
binding methodology for interpreting ambiguous agency regulations). 
 3. See Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 1, at 1775–1811 (describing efforts in several states). 
 4. E.g., Foster, supra note 1, at 1885, 1893–94; Connors, supra note 2, at 709. 
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The call for MP has not gone unchallenged. Several scholars have charged 
that MP is undesirable or even unconstitutional.5 But this Article’s inquiry is 
more positive and explanatory than normative. It examines some matters that 
are often taken for granted or overlooked on both sides of the normative debate 
but that should be sorted out before deciding whether to support the MP 
program. In particular, we need to answer questions like the following: What 
does it mean to have, or to lack, MP? Might we already have it, or at least much 
more of it than is commonly believed? How would we know if we have it? And 
how much difference would a robust practice of MP make? 
This Article tackles those questions. The Article’s first task, which is taken 
up in Part I, is to sort out what it would mean to have MP and what kinds of 
evidence would indicate that MP exists in a judicial system. Authors are rarely 
explicit about their criteria for MP’s existence, which tends to confuse the whole 
debate. Part I therefore develops a list of indicia, to be detected in judges’ 
actions and attitudes, that would show the existence of MP. 
With a proper conceptual understanding of MP in place, Parts II and III 
then assess whether the federal courts today exhibit MP. Part II focuses on how 
courts talk about methodology, while Part III focuses on how courts handle 
methodology. Although the nature of interpretive methodology precludes 
precisely measuring the scope and strength of MP, the evidence marshaled in 
Parts II and III shows, at a minimum, that there is much more MP than either 
MP’s backers or its detractors recognize.6 Moreover, the phenomenon of MP is 
not limited to the Chevron deference doctrine (“the Chevron doctrine”),7 which 
some MP advocates believe has already obtained precedential status. 8  The 
 
 5. E.g., Brudney & Baum, supra note 1, at 760–61; Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against 
Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1581–95 (2014); Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, 
Administrative Deference, and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1148–52 (2019) [hereinafter 
Kozel, Statutory Interpretation]; Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory 
Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 48 (2010); Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory 
Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 904–06 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)); Glen Staszewski, The 
Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209, 268–70 (2015); Jennifer M. Bandy, Note, 
Interpretive Freedom: A Necessary Component of Article III Judging, 61 DUKE L.J. 651, 676–77 (2011); see 
also Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Pluralism and Constitutional Interpretation, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 
1, 5 (2014) (expressing skepticism about methodological stare decisis in the context of constitutional 
interpretation). For an article that was against what one might recognize as MP even before others 
were for it, see generally Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory 
Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1 (2004). 
 6. Note that this Article is limited to federal courts interpreting federal statutes. I believe that 
the federal courts’ perception that they are required to use state methodology when interpreting state 
statutes has been underestimated too, and I take up that subject in future work. 
 7. The Chevron deference doctrine refers to the process by which courts evaluate an agency’s 
interpretation of a governing statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842–43 (1984). 
 8. E.g., Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 1, at 1817; Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach 
Us About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 613 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck, 
99 N.C. L. REV. 101 (2020) 
106 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
Chevron doctrine is not exceptional, and, in fact, the Chevron doctrine may not 
even be a particularly strong example of MP. 
Observers underestimate MP’s prevalence not only because they lack a 
proper definition of it but also because they focus too much on the Supreme 
Court and, moreover, on a few of its fiercest methodological battles, particularly 
the fight over the use of legislative history. Perhaps it was not an accident that 
Justice Gorsuch’s recent concurring opinion in Kisor v. Wilkie,9 which advocated 
rejecting administrative law’s Auer deference doctrine (“the Auer doctrine”),10 
invoked both of those narrowing features in suggesting that interpretive 
frameworks like the Auer doctrine may not even be eligible for precedential 
status. 11 “We [presumably meaning the Justices],” he wrote, “do not regard 
statements in our opinions about such generally applicable interpretive 
methods, like the proper weight to afford historical practice in constitutional 
cases or legislative history in statutory cases, as binding future Justices with the full 
force of horizontal stare decisis.”12 
Whatever the precedential status of interpretive methodology at the 
Supreme Court, the Court is generally the worst place to look for any kind of 
precedent. The Court’s docket consists of a small and unrepresentative set of 
cases that are chosen precisely because the law governing them is 
underdeterminate and, often, because the cases have high moral and political 
stakes.13 By contrast, the evidence of MP is pervasive in the lower courts. The 
different treatment of MP across the levels of the judicial system, which is 
documented in Parts II and III, provides further support for the proposition 
that approaches to statutory interpretation are hierarchically variable.14 
 
30 Years of Chevron]; J. Stephen Tagert, Note, To Erie or Not To Erie: Do Federal Courts Follow State 
Statutory Interpretation Methodologies?, 66 DUKE L.J. 211, 215 n.23 (2016). But see Connor N. Raso & 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates 
Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1766 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court does not apply deference doctrines in a precedential way). 
 9. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 10. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding that an agency’s evaluation of its own 
regulations is reasonably unless “plainly erroneous”). 
 11. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2444–45 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 12. Id. at 2444 (emphasis added). 
 13. Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 381, 399–400 (2007) [hereinafter Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered]; see also Gluck, 
Laboratories, supra note 1, at 1820–21 (“[A]t least one reason [for the dominance of legal skepticism in 
statutory interpretation] is what has been the almost exclusive focus on the U.S. Supreme Court . . . .”). 
 14. Previous research shows, for example, that courts at different levels differ in terms of which 
tools they tend to use. See Lawrence Baum & James J. Brudney, Two Roads Diverged: Statutory 
Interpretation by the Circuit Courts and Supreme Court in the Same Cases, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 839–
40 (2019); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between 
the Lower Federal Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 64–65 (2018) [hereinafter Bruhl, 
Statutory Interpretation]. 
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Nonetheless, although the evidence of MP at the Supreme Court is 
admittedly mixed, Parts II and III also aim to adduce enough previously 
unappreciated evidence of MP at the Supreme Court to demonstrate that 
observers who have assumed that there is no MP should adjust their prior views 
about the Court’s behavior. In that regard, note that the majority opinion in 
Kisor, without directly disputing Justice Gorsuch’s doubts about Auer’s 
eligibility for precedential status, did conduct a stare decisis analysis in deciding 
to modify Auer rather than overrule it—“overrule” being the Court’s 
terminology, a telling choice given that only precedents require overruling.15 
Having surveyed MP’s extent in Parts II and III, the Article then 
considers the implications of the current state of MP in Part IV. That our 
practice of interpretation is already semi-precedential is good news for the MP 
movement in that it shows that MP is not a hopeless fantasy. The news gets 
better still when one considers that the conditions are ripe for some further 
expansion of MP in the future. However, the findings of Parts II and III raise 
a question that should worry the backers of the MP program. Namely, if MP is 
already a prominent and expanding feature of current judicial practice, why does 
it not feel that way to those who hunger for it? Part IV explains that the existing 
practice of MP feels dissatisfying because it has not delivered on its advocates’ 
goal of predictability in outcomes. Worse, it probably cannot deliver on that 
goal, even if we do enter, as we plausibly will, a future era of stronger and more 
expansive MP. 
Finally, the Article concludes by suggesting that MP, once it is properly 
understood, should play a different role in future normative debates about 
statutory interpretation. The most important questions going forward are not 
about MP’s feasibility but rather about what methods and rules are desirable. 
That is, the focus of normative interpretive theory should return to content, 
though the old debates over what methods are desirable should now be informed 
by a proper understanding of and prospects for precedentialization of different 
approaches and rules. 
I. WHAT WOULD IT MEAN TO HAVE METHODOLOGICAL PRECEDENT, 
AND HOW WOULD WE KNOW IF WE HAVE IT? 
This part describes what it means to have MP and develops criteria for 
how to detect it. Section I.A begins by considering precedent as a general 
phenomenon rather than MP in particular. Section I.B builds upon that 
understanding to develop a conception of precedent that is suitable to the 
domain of interpretative methodology. Section I.C explains why the search for 
MP should target certain canons more than others. Section I.D considers the 
criteria that other scholars have employed (sometimes only implicitly) in 
 
 15. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2409, 2422–23. 
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reaching their conclusions that the federal courts do not have MP. Section I.E 
summarizes the indicia of precedential behavior that will be used in Parts II and 
III to search for the presence of MP. 
A. Precedent in General 
We should first distinguish between a conceptual inquiry—what does it 
mean to follow precedent?—and an epistemic or evidentiary inquiry—how do we 
know if courts are following precedent? Both are important, but they are not the 
same. Let us begin with the conceptual inquiry. 
As a general matter, to treat a prior decision as precedent is to treat it as 
providing a reason for action in accordance with the prior decision regardless of 
the prior decision’s correctness. That is, to treat a prior decision as precedent is 
to treat it as an authority, a source of content-independent reasons for action.16 
In the federal judiciary, lower courts cannot overrule the precedents of a 
superior court, and they must treat them as reasons for action that are conclusive 
within their scope.17 So, for example, if the Supreme Court has held that a 
certain filing deadline is a jurisdictional requirement and failure to comply with 
the deadline cannot be excused by equitable defenses, then a lower court must 
reject an untimely filing—even if the lower court disagrees with the Court’s 
reasoning and would accept the filing if the decision were its own to make.18 
Our modern understanding of precedent gives full force, at least as a 
matter of vertical precedent and circuit law, to a proposition as soon as it is 
established by a single published case from an authoritative court.19 According 
to the older, declaratory theory of the common law, judicial opinions are not 
law but merely imperfect evidence of it.20 On that theory, precedent solidifies 
over time rather than springing into existence through a single act of judicial 
positing. It may be that older notions of common law as a discovered, “general” 
 
 16. See Deborah Hellman, An Epistemic Defense of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 63, 64–65 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 
in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 123, 124 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) 
[hereinafter Schauer, Precedent]. 
 17. Precedents from outside the jurisdiction are conventionally called “persuasive authorities.” 
See generally Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55 (2009) 
(discussing the nature of persuasive authorities). This Article concerns Supreme Court and same-
circuit precedents, which have force beyond their mere power to persuade. 
 18. E.g., United States ex rel. Haight v. Cath. Healthcare W., 602 F.3d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 19. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001); John B. Oakley, Precedent in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals: An Endangered or Invasive Species?, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 123, 125–29 
(2006). By vertical precedent, I refer to the rule that rulings of hierarchically superior courts are 
absolutely binding on courts below them, as opposed to the doctrine of horizontal precedent that applies 
to a court’s own prior rulings. 
 20. See generally Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the 
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1999) (tracing the rise of the modern understanding of stare 
decisis). 
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law are a better fit for interpretive methodology than the modern notion of 
judicially posited law.21 Nonetheless, for purposes of this Article, I will use the 
modern understanding of precedent and show that methodology possesses not 
only features of a customary general law but also honest-to-goodness binding 
effect in the modern sense in which federal courts understand precedent. 
Because treating a decision as precedential requires a certain attitude 
toward it—regarding it as providing a reason for acting in a certain way—
precedent involves both more and less than decisional outcomes. To adapt an example 
from Frederick Schauer, if someone in a position of authority (such as a parent 
or military superior) orders me to eat pistachio ice cream, which I happen to 
love, then eating the ice cream does not show that I treated the order as the 
reason, or any reason, for my behavior.22 And so, precedent is not necessarily 
operating merely because judicial behavior is consistent with what precedent 
directs. The precedent must be treated as a reason for acting in line with the 
precedent, independent of any persuasive force of the precedent’s content.23 In 
that sense, outcomes are not sufficient when assessing precedential influence. 
Nor are particular outcomes necessary. A decision maker may give force 
to precedent even without deciding in the direction that precedent directs. A 
precedent can push a decision maker in one direction, yet the precedent’s force 
can be overcome by contrary reasons pushing the other way. That is, the reason 
for action generated by precedent need not be conclusive.24 A familiar example 
in our system comes from the fact that the Supreme Court may overrule its own 
precedents.25 Even when the Court does that, though, in a system of precedent, 
the Court would feel the pull of precedent rather than merely ruling as if the 
slate were clean. 26  That is why the Court generally says that stare decisis 
requires it to provide reasons—such as unworkability or changed 
circumstances—beyond those that it would offer in a case of first impression.27 
Turn now to the evidentiary matter of how we would detect precedent. 
We can look for evidence of precedent in both attitudes and actions. As for 
 
 21. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 
1137 (2017) [hereinafter Baude & Sachs, The Law of Interpretation]; Charles W. Tyler, The Adjudicative 
Model of Precedent, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1551, 1571 n. 121 (2020); see also Anita S. Krishnakumar & 
Victoria F. Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEX. L. REV. 163, 179–90 (2018) (setting out positive 
guideposts for determining whether a proposition is a canon, which include frequency and longevity of 
use). 
 22. Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered, supra note 13, at 385–86. 
 23. Id. at 386–87. 
 24. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 16, at 124–25. 
 25. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–22 (1997). 
 26. See NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 112–13 (2008). One 
could deny that the Justices in fact feel that pull; nevertheless, that does not affect the conceptual point. 
 27. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134–35 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment) (following precedent set by an opinion from which Chief Justice Roberts 
dissented). 
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attitudes, evidence of precedent can take the form of what judges say in their 
decisions, speeches, or elsewhere about their sense of obligation. Thus, we 
should expect to find judges (especially on inferior courts) stating that 
“precedent requires” such and such or that the court is “bound by [Case X]” to 
rule this way or that. Additionally, when a court has the power to overrule 
precedent, we should expect an overruling to be accompanied by an analysis 
that acknowledges an obligation to find special factors that justify changing 
course.28 
In response to the previous paragraph, a skeptical sort of person might 
demand to see not just statements attesting to obligation but behavioral 
evidence of it. Fair enough, though one should keep in mind that courts’ words, 
to a substantial degree, are their actions.29 Behavioral evidence of precedent 
most compellingly reveals itself when precedent causes one to act against what 
one would otherwise prefer.30 To return to the ice cream example, it would be 
really good evidence of my obedience to authority if, despite hating orange 
sherbet, I ate orange sherbet on command. Similarly, one very good kind of 
evidence for the existence of precedent is the existence of decisions that would 
have been different but for the precedent.31 (Again, this is an evidentiary point, 
not a conceptual one: it is logically possible, just practically unlikely, that the 
law will always align with what judges otherwise prefer.) It will often be 
difficult to tell whether precedent is the but-for cause of an outcome, especially 
if one is inclined to disbelieve self-accounts, but the task needs to be attempted. 
B. Methodological Precedent in Particular 
The discussion above concerns legal precedent in general—what it is and 
how we can detect it—but we are more concerned with the specific matter of 
precedent in interpretive methodology. Are some context-specific adjustments 
needed? Yes and no. 
At the conceptual level, MP is the same as other types of precedent: a 
methodological proposition (such as a directive not to use a source unless the 
 
 28. E.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998); see also Randy J. Kozel, Special 
Justifications, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 471, 473–85 (2018) (describing various accounts of what special 
factors are required). 
 29. That is, courts’ most significant actions largely take the form of statements (especially for 
appellate courts). Their words are often performative “speech acts,” such as acts of lawmaking, rather 
than mere talk. For a description of performative speech, see generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO 
THINGS WITH WORDS 4–7 (J.O. Urmson ed., 1962). 
 30. See Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015) (“[S]tare decisis has consequence 
only to the extent it sustains incorrect decisions . . . .”); Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) (emphasizing the diagnostic value of incorrect precedents). 
 31. Cf. Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered, supra note 13, at 387 (looking for evidence of 
precedent by searching for, among other things, “an appreciable number of instances . . . in which a 
Justice who would have decided a case in one way held otherwise solely because of the obligation to 
follow precedent”). 
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text is ambiguous or to use one canon before another) is precedent if it is treated 
as providing a content-independent reason for acting in accordance with its 
directions. In lower courts, the proposition must be obeyed when it applies. In 
the Supreme Court, it must be obeyed when it applies unless it is overruled. 
(Set aside the familiar difficulties of determining the content of the proposition 
established in a prior case and how to reconcile conflicting propositions, which 
are universal.) 
When it comes to looking for evidence of MP, some things are the same 
while others are different. As with precedent generally, we need to consider 
both attitudes and actions. Regarding how judges talk about interpretive 
methodology, we should ask questions like these: Do they speak in terms of 
legal obligation, using phrases like “Supreme Court precedent requires”? Do 
they talk about canons as the sort of thing that could be overruled but, barring 
overruling, must be followed (as opposed to ignored or treated as optional)? 
Neither of these inquiries is distinctive to MP. 
Regarding judicial actions, the particular context of interpretive 
methodology does require some adjustment to our evidentiary standards. The 
filing deadline described above was a hard-edged rule that clearly applied and 
fully resolved whether the late filing could be accepted. Much of the law of 
interpretation (if law it be) lacks a rule-like form, lacks outcome-determinative 
character, or both. These characteristics do not raise insurmountable barriers to 
identifying evidence of MP, but they are important enough to merit some 
further discussion. 
First, one significant difficulty involves the doctrinal form of many 
methodological propositions, in particular the prevalence of nonrule 
propositions. One could imagine an interpretive regime that features many 
bright-line rules. For example, the regime could have clear rules of admissibility 
such as, “Webster’s Second Edition is the only permissible dictionary for 
construing criminal statutes.” Or a method could have many clear rules of 
priority like, “Consider tool X before tool Y before tool Z.” Our actual practice 
of interpretation has some bright-line rules, but it also has many standards and 
multifactored balancing tests, plus complex amalgams of forms. Consider the 
following familiar kind of proposition: 
If a statute of type T is ambiguous [and condition C applies, etc.], then choose 
interpretation Z. For example, if a statute concerning Native American 
tribal sovereignty is ambiguous, and there is no agency regulation that 
reasonably resolves the ambiguity, then read the statute in favor of the 
tribe.32 
 
 32. This method of interpretation is part of what is known as the Indian Canons of Construction. 
See, e.g., Jill De La Hunt, The Canons of Indian Treaty and Statutory Construction: A Proposal for 
Codification, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681, 689 (1984). 
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This type of proposition has a rule-like cast, but the embedded triggering 
condition of ambiguity is itself vague and possibly ambiguous. So too with 
canons directing courts to avoid interpretations with absurd results or to select 
a “plausible” alternate construction in order to avoid “serious” constitutional 
doubt.33 
A second, related difficulty in detecting MP concerns outcome 
determinativeness. Outcome determination is always a tricky criterion, even for 
substantive law, but it is particularly poorly suited for trying to detect the 
binding force of things like interpretive canons. To appreciate this point, it 
helps to be precise about what we mean by an “outcome.” The relevant outcome 
cannot plausibly be the ultimate outcome of the case, as the case outcome may 
turn on the facts, a procedural problem, or a failure on some other element of a 
claim aside from the one that presents the interpretive puzzle. But even if we 
narrow our focus to a narrower conception of an “interpretive outcome”—that 
is, the interpretation of the statute at issue to mean X rather than Y (for instance, 
that bicycles are not “vehicles”)—the majority of canons are only loosely tied to 
outcomes so defined. True, some canons, such as the super strong clear-
statement rule protecting state immunity, require the pro-immunity 
interpretation unless there is unmistakable textual abrogation. 34  But more 
often, canons take the form of mandatory-but-nondeterminative presumptions 
about meaning or mandates to consider a particular factor in the course of 
arriving at an interpretation. For example: 
• A court should presume that a word has the same meaning every 
time it is used in a statute, though this presumption can be overcome 
by strong contrary evidence.35 
• A court should presume that Congress follows established rules of 
punctuation and grammar, but those considerations readily yield 
before contrary evidence.36 
• In deciding whether to adopt an agency’s informally generated (that 
is, non-Chevron eligible) interpretation, Mead 37  and Skidmore 38 
direct the court to consider the thoroughness of the agency’s 
 
 33. E.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 238–39 (2010). 
 34. E.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (“[E]vidence of congressional intent [to 
abrogate immunity] must be both unequivocal and textual.”). Although the failure to find clarity 
dictates an interpretive outcome, the requirement that text be “unequivocal” or “clear” is itself vague 
and its satisfaction is often disputable. 
 35. Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 108 (2012). 
 36. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 453–55 (1993). 
 37. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 38. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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reasoning, the degree of expertise implicated, the consistency of the 
interpretation over time, and other factors.39 
• Under the federal Dictionary Act40 and many state interpretation 
codes, various definitions and inferences apply presumptively, 
unless the context dictates otherwise.41 
In addition, one could regard at least some substantive canons as mandates to 
give some weight to a particular policy value in the analysis of the pertinent 
kind of statute or to break a tie in favor of that value if other sources are evenly 
balanced.42 
In short, many canons take the form of mandatory, but not necessarily 
outcome-determinative, inputs into a decision. This is probably why, to the 
uncharitable observer, statutory interpretation looks like a jumble of linguistic 
inferences, substantive presumptions, maxims, rules of thumb, thumbs on the 
scale, all of indeterminate weight, with little in the way of priority, any of which 
can be called forth according to the interpreter’s whim. This sense of unordered 
jumble, with only tenuous links to outcomes, no doubt underlies much of the 
skepticism of the possibility of MP. And, indeed, the nature of interpretation, 
even when conducted faithfully by its best craftspeople, probably does rule out 
the hope of ever achieving a highly predictable, fully determinate system of 
interpretation when applied to all cases. 
But it would be a mistake to leap from the proposition that much of the 
law of interpretation takes the form of imprecise standards and required-but-
nondeterminative inputs to the conclusion that there can be no binding law 
about such matters. We simply need to make sure we use a conception of 
bindingness that fits the nature of the thing at hand. For a canon, to be binding 
means that the canon is a mandatory contributor to the resolution of an 
interpretive problem and that it contributes in the way the canon specifies, 
when the conditions for the canon’s applicability are satisfied. The matter of 
how much the canon contributes to meaning relative to other inputs is sometimes 
dictated by the canon itself (for example, punctuation is supposed to be a weak 
contributor, while a clear-statement rule should determine an interpretation in 
 
 39. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 235; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 40. Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-278, § 1, 61 Stat. 633 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. 
§ 1). 1 U.S.C. § 1 is generally referred to as the “Dictionary Act,” which traces its modern-day roots 
back to 1947. See Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: The CBO 
Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What They Are Already Trying To Do, 84 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 177, 209 n.141 (2017). But cf. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 n.8 (1989). 
 41. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1; see also Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 
98 GEO. L.J. 341, 420–25 (2010) (listing many codified state presumptions). 
 42. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., JAMES J. BRUDNEY, JOSH CHAFETZ, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & 
ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 649 (6th ed. 
2019) (noting that presumptions “can be treated as a starting point for discussion, a tiebreaker at the 
end of discussion, or just a balancing factor”). 
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the absence of clear countervailing text). In other instances, the canon does not 
purport to specify the weight of its contribution, only that it has some weight. 
A court honors such a canon’s binding force by recognizing the obligation to 
give it some weight rather than none, and the court would err if it thought the 
canon demanded more. 
To say that precedent—and our mode of detecting it—takes on different 
coloration depending on the content of the law at issue should not be 
mysterious. Standards like “reasonable care,” “substantial performance,” and 
“material misrepresentation” are familiar in the substantive law, and so there 
should be no great surprise to find the law of interpretation populated by 
standards and not just rules. Mandatory inputs—the form taken by many 
canons—are common in other domains of law as well. Consider these examples: 
• The Copyright Act of 197643 provides a nonexhaustive list of several 
factors that bear on the fair-use defense.44 “All [of the factors] are to 
be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the 
purposes of copyright.”45 It is error to treat one factor as dispositive, 
though some factors should be given more weight than others.46 
• In criminal sentencing, district judges must consider several factors 
and can be reversed for failing to do so, though the factors do not 
select a uniquely correct sentence.47 
• The Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine is an amalgam 
of standards (“minimum contacts”), factors of different weights 
(such as the burden on the defendant and the forum state’s interests), 
plus a few sharp rules for special cases like in-state service.48 
• The widely adopted Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws sets out 
a number of principles and factors that courts should consider in 
deciding which state’s substantive law to apply.49 The approach of 
the Restatement (Second) may not be particularly determinate, but it 
is erroneous to disregard the approach where it has been adopted.50 
 
 43. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 44. § 107, 90 Stat. at 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
 45. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). 
 46. Id. at 584, 591; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007); United States v. 
Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 48. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (AM. L. INST. 1971). 
 50. See, e.g., Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420–21 (Tex. 1984), superseded by 
statute, Act of June 3, 1987, ch. 2, §§ 2.03–.06, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 37, 41 (amended 1995) (current 
version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 33.001–.004), as recognized in Sky View at Las Palmas, 
LLC v. Mendez, 555 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. 2018). 
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Formalists might deem the examples above to be poorly devised law, because 
they are not sufficiently rule-like, but they are still the law. So, the fact that 
much of the law of interpretation (if law it be) takes nonrule forms raises some 
evidentiary hurdles, but it is not a barrier to precedential status. 
A concluding word on evidentiary expectations in theory and in practice: 
the discussion above shows that canons and other methodological propositions 
can, as a conceptual matter, be binding law even if they do not change case 
outcomes or the construction a statute ultimately receives. They only need to 
act as a mandate to analyze a statute in the way the canon directs if the canon 
directs at all. Still, if judges treat the canons as precedential, then we can expect 
to observe those canons exerting some influence on interpretive outcomes. 
When surveying a sufficiently large number of cases, we can reasonably expect 
to find some in which the interpretation of a statute comes out differently than 
it would have without a precedential duty to apply a canon. 
C. Canons that Provide the Best Testing Grounds for Methodological Precedent 
As a practical matter, certain interpretive propositions afford better 
opportunities for testing for MP than others. This is so for a few reasons. 
To begin, recall the problem of behavioral equivalence highlighted by the 
ice cream example: acting consistently with a command does not confirm the 
existence of precedent if the behavior would occur regardless. Behavioral 
equivalence is a real problem for detecting the precedential force of canons of 
interpretation that reflect sensible patterns of natural communication, as 
readers would use them as guides to meaning without being told to do so. For 
example, a communication referring to the tax treatment of “income resulting 
from exploration, discovery, or prospecting” would more likely be thought to 
apply to income resulting from the discovery of a mineral vein than from the 
invention (“discovery”) of a new image-processing technology—and that is true 
even if no one had ever heard of the maxim noscitur a sociis, which tells us, 
sensibly enough, that words often draw meaning from the words surrounding 
them.51 “Exploration” and especially “prospecting” suggest digging around for 
things like oil and minerals, so it is sensible to read “discovery” similarly, at 
least in the absence of countervailing clues. The law’s wise decision, often 
implicit, is to accept many preexisting communicative presumptions—along 
with their limitations and defeasible nature—as tools of statutory 
interpretation.52 
 
 51. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 201 (2006). 
The example is derived from Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). 
 52. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“The rules of legal interpretation are rules of common sense, adopted by the courts in the construction 
of the laws.”). 
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To be clear, not all language-based canons reflect ordinary patterns of 
communication. For example, the rule against superfluity—that every part of a 
statute must be given meaning53—can be a legally valid interpretive rule even if 
ordinary speakers and legislative drafters use redundancy. The prevalence of 
redundant language in both ordinary and statutory language might show that a 
rule against superfluity is a bad interpretive rule for courts to embrace, but rules 
with premises that butt their heads against reality can still be the law.54 Indeed, 
when rules of interpretation are only creatures of law, it is easier to determine 
whether their use is the product of legal obligation. 
Turning to substantive canons, some are like noscitur a sociis in that they 
reflect the likely legislative intent or, if one prefers, the meaning a reasonable, 
informed reader would impute to uncertain language. 55  For example, it is 
plausible that the presumption against retroactivity “will generally coincide 
with legislative and public expectations.”56 If that is so, then telling someone to 
follow that rule is like telling someone to breathe normally. When a proposition 
does dual work as a rule of communication and, by explicit or implicit adoption, 
as a rule of law, observing its use does not provide strong evidence for MP. 
Case citations accompanying a canon do not necessarily signal legal obligation 
either, for it is a rhetorical convention that one provides a citation for almost 
everything.57 
 The discussion above does not mean that dual-duty canons cannot be at 
all probative of whether a system displays MP. If courts use the normative 
language of duty when they invoke canons, that provides some modest 
affirmative evidence that precedent is operating. 58  More significantly, any 
canon can tend to disprove the existence of MP if it is wielded in certain ways. 
For example, a statement by a lower court that noscitur a sociis is not a valid 
canon at all—or, for that matter, that noscitur a sociis is a conclusive determinant 
 
 53. E.g., Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 965–66 (2016). 
 54. In addition to embracing a bad rule, the law might exclude a good rule of communication. An 
effort at exclusion might not be wholly successful, however. The Court might succeed in banishing the 
phrase noscitur a sociis from the case reports, for example, but it is hard to imagine that the natural 
intuition behind it could be so easily rooted out. Cf. Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1457 (2017) (explaining that courts would have 
a hard time ignoring the deferential instinct that lies behind the Chevron doctrine even if it were 
formally overruled). A smart court would not fight natural interpretive strategies too often. 
 55. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 28–29 (1997). See generally Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. 
L. REV. 109, 117–21 (2010) (describing the fraught relationship between substantive canons and 
legislative supremacy). 
 56. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994). 
 57. Courts often provide citations to prior cases for familiar canons like ejusdem generis. Lawrence 
M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1186 (2016). 
 58. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56–57 (2d ed. 1994) (observing that binding rules 
differ from social habits, among other ways, because people take a reflective attitude toward the rules, 
which is commonly expressed through normative language like “must” and “right”). 
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of meaning—would contradict prevailing doctrine. If a court makes such a 
statement even while acknowledging contrary decisions, that counts against 
MP’s existence. If the court seems, instead, to be mistaken about or ignorant of 
how the canon works, that provides some mild evidence that MP may exist in 
principle but is not functioning very well. 
Fortunately for our ability to find solid evidence of MP, many rules of 
interpretation are not like the unneeded command to “breathe normally.” They 
do not reflect regularities of communication or likely intents. 59  Ordinary 
language does not have a rule about whether tax exemptions are to be 
interpreted narrowly, broadly, or just normally, but the law might. Similarly, 
the canon of constitutional avoidance and the rule of lenity are not rules of 
language, nor do they reflect likely congressional intentions—the contrary is 
more likely the case60—but they can exist as rules of law nonetheless. These 
artificial rules provide good tests in both directions: adherence to them tends to 
show legal obligation, and departure from them (especially open departure) 
tends to show the absence of the same. 
Secondary rules governing the relationship between canons also tend to 
provide good testing grounds, even when the secondary rules govern the use of 
canons that are not helpful test subjects. Ordinary habits of communication 
suggest the value of noscitur a sociis, but they do not tell us whether to use it or 
other canons before or after legislative history or administrative 
interpretations—though, again, the law might choose to impose such a priority. 
To sum up the discussion regarding the best testing grounds for detecting 
or rejecting MP: First, contradicting or rejecting any established canon can cast 
doubt on MP. Second, the best canons for detecting the existence of MP tend 
to be those that are not rules of ordinary communication. Third, rules about the 
admissibility of sources like administrative interpretations and legislative history 
and rules that establish the relative priority of interpretive tools (of whatever 
type) are also good test subjects, precisely because such rules are artifices of the 
law. 
 
 59. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 221–29 
(1975) (distinguishing between factual presumptions used in ascertaining legislative meaning and legal 
rules used in assigning judicial meaning); Baude & Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, supra note 21, at 
1088–97 (distinguishing between canons as rules of language and canons as rules of law); see also Abbe 
R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 1, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 926–33 (2013) (showing 
that some canons purportedly based on congressional expectations are only dimly known in Congress). 
Alexander and Prakash doubt the constitutionality of courts’ use of artificial interpretive rules that 
depart from attempts at discerning actual meaning. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May 
I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 102–04 
(2003). For purposes of this Article, I assume the courts’ routine use of such rules is indeed 
constitutional. 
 60. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2193 
(2002). 
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Now, to be clear, following an artificial rule does not necessarily show 
constraint. A judge might use the artificial rule because, in a happy coincidence, 
it advances the judge’s extra-legal preferences (like pistachio ice cream). The 
very best evidence of obligation will come from those cases in which there is 
reason to believe the decisionmaker is following an artificial rule that is not 
otherwise agreeable.61 Such cases will be hard to identify with certainty, but 
there are some.62 
D. Other Scholars’ Understandings of Methodological Precedent 
As the final step before setting out my list of criteria for the existence of 
MP, it is helpful to check the validity of my account of MP by considering the 
accounts of other scholars. As stated above, the prevailing view is that there is 
no general practice of MP in the federal courts.63 At the same time, it has been 
argued that some state systems have adopted MP and that, within the federal 
courts, the Chevron doctrine has achieved precedential status. Those 
conclusions—about federal interpretation generally, Chevron in particular, and 
the MP situation in certain states—must rely on some explicit or implicit 
criteria for the detection of precedent. 
1. Methodological Precedent in Some State Courts 
Let us begin with the considerations that led Abbe Gluck to conclude that 
some state courts have established binding interpretive approaches. Her best 
example is Oregon, where, for about fifteen years, the state courts followed an 
interpretive approach known as the “PGE framework” (named after the case 
that announced it). 64  What facts about the Oregon experience did Gluck 
marshal to show that PGE was binding law? Facts like the following: Oregon 
courts routinely cited PGE and its prescribed hierarchy of sources as supplying 
the governing law of interpretation.65 Dissenters disagreed with case-specific 
applications of PGE but not with the framework’s binding nature.66 The state 
supreme court’s use of legislative history and substantive canons dropped 
markedly during the PGE era, which suggests that PGE was actually obeyed.67 
Some cases probably came out differently due to the exclusion of nontextual 
 
 61. Cf. Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 21, at 188–89 (arguing that usage across ideological 
divides is necessary to canon status). 
 62. See infra Sections III.B, III.D. 
 63. Supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 64. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Or. 1993); see 
Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 1, at 1775–85. 
 65. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 1, at 1775. 
 66. Id. at 1775, 1781; Jack L. Landau, Oregon As a Laboratory for Statutory Interpretation, 47 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 563, 566 n.9, 567–68 (2011). 
 67. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 1, at 1779–80. 
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sources at PGE’s first step; judges certainly said so.68 All of these are the kinds 
of things that count as evidence of MP according to the account I set out above. 
Note that it does not matter for purposes of the validity of the criteria whether 
the facts about Oregon remain true or ever were true. 
Gluck adds, as another indication of precedent, that appellate courts in at 
least one of the states she studied have vacated and remanded cases merely 
because the lower court used the wrong method, without reviewing the 
outcome. 69  That too is telling, inasmuch as the reviewing courts treat 
methodology as worthy of concern and correction for its own sake. 
2. Chevron Exceptionalism 
Some authors identify the Chevron doctrine as an exception to the general 
lack of MP in the federal courts.70 Chevron has become the shorthand for the 
idea that courts should defer to certain authoritative agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes.71 It does not matter whether the commentators are correct 
about the Chevron doctrine being exceptional, but it is helpful to ask what 
features lead them to regard the Chevron doctrine as exceptional. 
The Chevron doctrine’s purported exceptional status cannot be attributed 
to any vast alteration in the Supreme Court’s propensity to defer to agencies. 
The extent to which the Chevron doctrine changed the level of deference is 
surprisingly difficult to measure, but, at least at the Supreme Court level, even 
Chevron’s fans have to admit the effect is probably modest.72 Nor is Chevron 
composed of bright-line rules that can be expected to yield highly predictable 
outcomes. On the contrary, Step 1 incorporates the squishy trigger of 
ambiguity/clarity.73 So, the Chevron doctrine is hardly the obvious poster child 
for the possibility of MP. 
For Gluck, the Chevron doctrine is precedential because it establishes a 
mandatory analytical framework for agency cases, a framework that is generally 
used and which courts speak about in precedential ways.74 Those criteria are 
 
 68. Id. at 1781; see also id. at 1823 (noting in her study that judges in some states “say they would 
decide cases differently were they not constrained by the interpretive framework”). 
 69. Id. at 1807–08, 1823. 
 70. Supra note 8 and accompanying text. Gluck states that the extraterritoriality canon may be 
another “emerging exception[],” writing that “in recent years [it] seems to have taken on the status of 
something closer to a precedential rule than a presumption of statutory interpretation.” Gluck, 30 Years 
of Chevron, supra note 8, at 614 n.29. Tagert posits the federalism clear-statement rule as an exception, 
though without explaining what makes it so. Tagert, supra note 8, at 215 n.23. 
 71. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984). 
 72. One difficulty is that agencies may become more aggressive in their interpretation if they 
believe the courts will judge them more leniently. See generally JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. 
STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 985–90 (3d ed. 2017) (describing the empirical 
research on Chevron and limitations of the same).  
 73. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 74. Gluck writes: 
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compatible with those I developed above. William Eskridge and his coauthors 
Lauren Baer and Connor Raso reject the precedential characterization for 
Chevron, at least at the Supreme Court level (the focus of their studies).75 They 
point out that precedents should be followed where applicable, distinguished if 
not applicable despite appearances, or (on rare occasions) overruled.76 I agree 
that those too are good criteria. They then contend, descriptively, that the 
Supreme Court often ignores Chevron when it seems to be applicable.77 The 
Court therefore does not, in their view, treat it as precedent.78 
The disagreement between Gluck on the one hand and Eskridge and his 
coauthors on the other hand stems from a few sources. One of them is empirical 
disagreement over how faithfully the courts adhere to Chevron. Behind that, and 
influencing the descriptive assessments, is an apparent difference in 
perspective: for Gluck, the important conclusion is that the precedential glass 
is at least half full when it comes to Chevron, where she sees the level so much 
lower for other canons and doctrines. Eskridge and his coauthors, by contrast, 
emphasize the half emptiness. Both camps largely agree on the kinds of things 
we should look for, though Gluck may credit opinion language a bit more than 
do Eskridge and his coauthors. 
3. The Purported General Absence of Methodological Precedent in the 
Federal System 
It is also important to consider why most observers believe that the federal 
system generally does not display MP outside of the Chevron context. As I 
disagree with that conclusion, I want to know whether the source of the 
disagreement is different criteria or different assessments of the evidence. 
 
Chevron is routinely referred to as a “precedent” by courts and scholars alike, and . . . it is one 
of the most cited cases in history. Indeed, Chevron is a precedent that was modified by another 
precedent (i.e., Mead) that was modified by yet another precedent (i.e., Brand X). . . . Nothing 
like this exists with respect to the rest of the interpretive doctrines. 
Gluck, 30 Years of Chevron, supra note 8, at 613–14; see also Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 1, at 1817–
19 (arguing that Chevron establishes a mandatory framework for analyzing cases, whether or not it 
succeeds in constraining outcomes). 
 75. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008); 
Raso & Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1733–34. 
 76. Raso & Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1751. 
 77. Id. at 1733–34, 1751, 1756–1757, 1764; Eskridge & Baer, supra note 75, at 1121. But see infra 
note 204 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court may not ignore Chevron as often 
as these articles claim). 
 78. Rather, the Court treats Chevron “only” as a canon, which means, for them, that it is invoked 
episodically rather than systematically and invoked in proportion to the case-specific force of its 
underlying policies rather than strictly according to agreed-upon rules. Raso & Eskridge, supra note 8, 
at 1734. 
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a. Other Scholars’ Criteria 
Among the many scholars who have observed or criticized the general lack 
of MP in the federal courts, and in the Supreme Court in particular, Sydney 
Foster has probably been the most precise about her criteria. She relies 
primarily on the lack of two indicia of precedential status. First is the absence 
of overruling analysis.79 That is, when the Court changes the interpretive rules, 
the Court generally does not engage in a stare decisis analysis that acknowledges 
the force of precedent, identifies special factors that justify overcoming it, 
reckons with reliance interests, and the like. Setting aside for the moment the 
truth of the factual premise that courts do not engage in such analyses in those 
(rather rare) instances in which they consider overruling methodological 
precedent, I agree that the presence or absence of such analyses is a good 
criterion.80 
Foster’s second indicator of the absence of MP is the absence of but-for 
causation. More specifically, Foster contends that judges do not apply 
interpretive principles or canons they oppose, which tends to show that they 
are not binding.81 I agree with Foster that the absence of but-for causation, if 
indeed it is absent, would be probative of the absence of MP.82 
Most commentators are less explicit and systemic about their criteria than 
Foster. Probably what most observers would cite as the key evidence for the 
absence of MP, if asked, is the fact that the Justices state and act upon 
inconsistent and even contradictory methodological propositions, often 
openly.83 The Justices’ disagreements include disputes over the high-level goals 
of statutory interpretation as well as disagreement over some key operative 
propositions. In addition, and to some degree as a result, the outcome of 
interpretive questions is hard to predict. 
Not all disagreements are created equal, however. For purposes of MP, 
disagreement over operative propositions is what matters, not disagreement over 
goals, not unpredictability of outcomes. Let me explain why operative 
propositions are the proper focus: 
Although there is disagreement over the goals of statutory interpretation, 
there are several reasons why disagreement over goals does not preclude MP. 
First, although the goals of interpretation interact with operative 
propositions—such as by suggesting the propriety and weight of certain tools 
over others—the goals of interpretation are underdeterminate with regard to 
 
 79. Foster, supra note 1, at 1875–77. 
 80. See infra Section III.C (assessing this factual premise). 
 81. Foster, supra note 1, at 1876–77, 1881. 
 82. I believe Foster is incorrect in finding an absence of but-for causation even at the Supreme 
Court level. See infra Section III.D. 
 83. E.g., Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle, supra note 1, at 388 (“[I]ndividual Justices, like the 
Court as a whole, seem to lack truly firm methodological [c]ommitments.”). 
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operative propositions. Goals do not decide cases but are instead mediated 
through operative propositions. Second, some matters of interpretive doctrine 
are low stakes, such that we can reasonably expect judges to set aside their 
preferred theory of interpretation, just as we routinely expect them to do on 
other legal matters. Third, and relatedly, adherents of different theories can 
forge “incompletely theorized agreements” in order to settle on operative rules 
or frameworks that everyone can accept.84 For example, most or all theories 
agree on the primacy of statutory text, even if they do so for different reasons: 
because “the text is the law,” because it is the best evidence of the legislative 
plan, and so on. Fourth, it is worth remembering that many judges lack any real 
theory of interpretation yet seem to do the job of judging just fine. Consider 
that judges need not have a theory of tort law, much less all share a theory of 
tort law—such as corrective justice, efficiency, or civil recourse—in order to do 
the work of tort judging. 
A lack of predictability in the outcomes of statutory interpretation cases is 
also offered as evidence for the lack of MP, at least implicitly in the sense that 
advocates of MP argue that adopting MP would provide the valuable benefit of 
fostering predictability in judicial decisionmaking. 85  But predictability of 
outcomes is not a good criterion either. A method’s precedential status and its 
propensity to generate predictable outcomes are different things. Cases can be 
highly predictable even without MP, such as if judges reliably vote based on 
ideology or other known, fixed characteristics. And, likewise, even with iron-
clad MP, the predictability of outcomes under the precedential method would 
depend on the content of that method. As in other domains, doctrines that 
feature standards (versus rules) and multifactor tests can be the law whether or 
not they generate highly predictable outcomes in all cases.86 
Moreover, difficulty in predicting interpretive outcomes is hardly 
surprising or unique given that scholars are usually looking at Supreme Court 
cases. 87  Cases proceed to the Supreme Court because they are legally 
underdetermined and, often, have stakes high enough to trigger a surge of extra-
legal preferences.88 Looking at cases in the upper reaches of the system and 
 
 84. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735–36 
(1995). 
 85. See Connors, supra note 2, at 709; Foster, supra note 1, at 1885, 1893–94. 
 86. Supra Section I.B. 
 87. See generally Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, 
The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004) (showing that legal experts underperformed a simple 
model in predicting Supreme Court decisions). 
 88. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 101, 44–45 
(2013). 
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finding substantial rates of dissent and reversal therefore tells us little about the 
constraining force of precedent. 
The things that matter for the existence of MP are neither goals nor 
outcomes but instead operative propositions of statutory interpretation. These 
bridge the space between goals and outcomes. Operative propositions govern 
things such as the following: 
• whether a presumption or canon exists; 
• the scope and formulation of the canon (in which circumstances does 
it apply and how weightily); 
• the relative priority of tools (where the law establishes any priority); 
and 
• the circumstances under which judges may consult legislative history 
(of various kinds), presidential signing statements, agency views, or 
other extrinsic sources. 
Thus, an operative proposition takes a form such as: The rule of lenity applies to 
civil provisions the violation of which can also be a crime; ambiguity in such a provision 
may not be resolved through recourse to legislative history. Or like this: The 
presumption against preemption has no application in express preemption cases. Or: 
Only dictionaries from the period during which a statute was enacted may be consulted. 
As the next section acknowledges, there is disagreement over some 
operative propositions of interpretive method. But, as it also explains, the 
existence of some disagreement is not determinative of the existence of MP. 
b. The Probative Value of Clashes over Legislative History 
How much evidentiary weight should one assign to disagreements over 
operative propositions? A couple scattered successes of precedentialization does 
not mean there is a system of MP worth talking about but neither does some 
conflict over propositions of law mean there is no meaningful system of MP. 
Precedentialization does not have to exist across all operative propositions in 
order to have a meaningful, though incomplete, system of MP. The importance 
of failures of MP depends on the frequency and persistence of disagreement 
and which topics are involved. 
The most obvious evidence for the claim that methodological propositions 
lack precedential force comes from the decades-old dispute on the Supreme 
Court between textualist and more pragmatic or intent-oriented interpreters 
regarding the permissible uses of legislative history.89 The permissible uses of 
legislative history implicate operative propositions, and open and sustained 
 
 89. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 212 
(2013); Connors, supra note 2, at 705–07; Foster, supra note 1, at 1865–66; Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 
2144. 
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disagreement over the use of legislative history counts against the existence of 
MP. 
How much does it count? We will be in a better position to assess the 
relative importance of the successes and failures of MP in different domains 
once we know more of the facts about actual judicial practices, which Parts II 
and III will set out. So, there will be more to say about conflicts over legislative 
history. For now, though, it suffices to say that the forthcoming evidence should 
be viewed with an appropriate baseline of “normal” levels of judicial 
disagreement in mind. The Supreme Court, in its meritorious decisions on 
substantive questions, is not famous for rigorously obeying stare decisis. 90 
Although express overruling is not the norm, the Court regularly engages in 
“stealth overruling,” narrowing, or other indirect methods of arguable 
noncompliance with law.91 Individual Justices often do not reconcile themselves 
to decisions from which they originally dissented. Some of the Court’s more 
liberal Justices have never reconciled themselves to the Court’s Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence and repeatedly dissent from it in later cases that 
involve applications of the doctrine.92 Some of the conservative Justices have 
been ready to overrule Roe v. Wade 93  whenever the necessary votes 
materialize. 94  Viewing the matter more systematically, Harold Spaeth and 
Jeffrey Segal’s study of precedent at the Supreme Court showed that members 
of the Rehnquist Court usually continued to disagree with precedents from 
which they originally dissented, including three-quarters of the time for 
relatively “ordinary” cases.95 
In short, the existence of some departures from precedent does not mean 
that stare decisis does not exist at all. Even more clearly, a casual attitude toward 
precedent at the Supreme Court level does not tell us much about the practices 
of the lower courts, where the vast majority of cases are decided. 
 
 90. See Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered, supra note 13 at 399. The qualification about 
“merits decisions” is important; many denials of certiorari must reflect the power of stare decisis. 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 45 (2008); Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really 
Mattered, supra note 13, at 399–400. 
 91. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. 
Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 6–8 (2010). 
 92. E.g., Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 46 n.1 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 699–700 (1999) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 93. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 94. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 95. HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: 
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 272–86 (1999); see also Allison Orr 
Larsen, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 447, 453–58 (2008) (reporting that every member 
of the Rehnquist Court had engaged in perpetual dissenting on certain topics). 
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E. Summary: Signs of Methodological Precedent 
Time to take stock and summarize. As a conceptual matter, following MP 
is treating a methodological proposition as an authority, a source of reasons for 
action that apply independent of the proposition’s persuasive appeal. As for 
how to detect the operation of MP, we should look at what courts do when they 
interpret statutes and why they do it. Courts should state propositions of law 
that conform to prior decisions and should not state contradictory 
propositions. 96  Courts should use canons when their triggering criteria are 
satisfied. And, at least when challenged, judges should identify the law as 
providing a reason for their interpretive choices. Ideally, we would be able to 
confirm the courts’ self-reports of legal obligation by identifying instances in 
which a court would have analyzed the statute differently, and even reached a 
different interpretation, but for the binding law of interpretation. However, we 
should keep in mind that finding such cases is complicated by the nature of the 
enterprise. 
In sum, here are things we should look for as evidence of MP: 
• Courts describe methodology in language indicative of precedent 
(“binding,” “holdings,” etc.). 
• Courts describe methodology as the sort of thing that can be 
overruled (rather than ignored). 
• Courts treat canons like precedent. More particularly, courts: 
 do not state incorrect or inconsistent methodological 
propositions, 
 apply canons when their triggering conditions are 
satisfied, 
 engage in distinguishing behavior, and 
 conduct an overruling analysis when they overrule. 
• Appellate courts regard methodological errors as worth their 
attention (as manifested, for example, in their practices of error 
correction and discretionary review). 
• Canons are, at least sometimes, but-for causes of interpretive 
outcomes. 
The more of these indicia that are present, and the more regularly they are 
observed, the more confident we can be in MP’s existence and extent. It is not 
possible to say exactly how often the indicia above must be detected, either in 
 
 96. Cf. William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2371 (2015) 
(identifying, as evidence that judicial practice is originalist, the Supreme Court’s choice of originalism 
when different methods collide and the absence of cases contradicting originalism). 
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absolute terms or as a proportion of relevant cases, in order to count as solid 
evidence of a meaningful amount of MP. As recounted above, much of statutory 
interpretation parallels the automatic processes of ordinary interpretation, 
many interpretive propositions are not particularly rule-like, and some 
interpretive propositions align with preexisting judicial preferences. All of those 
make precise testing impossible. What I can do is provide quite a bit of 
probative evidence, measured according to the criteria set out above, involving 
many different interpretive rules, including examples that should be surprising 
in light of the conventional rejection of MP’s existence. Also highly probative 
is the paucity of cases, especially in the lower courts, that contradict the 
existence of MP. 
II. DO COURTS DESCRIBE METHODOLOGY AS BINDING? 
Having identified the kinds of evidence to look for, we can now begin the 
search for that evidence. As described above, one aspect of following precedent 
is acting with a particular attitude, and so this part considers how courts describe 
interpretive methodology. Section II.A shows that courts often refer to 
methodology as binding or otherwise speak about it in ways that present it as 
precedential. Section II.B explains that courts also describe methodology as the 
sort of thing that can be overruled, which actually supports MP in that 
overruling applies only to matters that are law. 
A. Courts Refer to Methodological Propositions in Ways that Suggest the Sense of 
Obligation Associated with Precedent 
There are several features of legal rhetoric that suggest precedential status 
for interpretive methodology. This section canvasses some of them. The 
evidence for MP is strongest in the lower courts, but it can be found in the 
Supreme Court too. 
1. Looking for Binding Law—and Finding It 
Lower courts often state that they must apply the canons because a 
previous decision of the Supreme Court or the circuit has commanded it. That 
is, lower courts speak of “binding” interpretive frameworks, of being “required” 
to use a canon, and the like. The cases refer, indeed, to interpretive “precedent” 
that it is their duty, as inferior courts, to apply. There are many examples of 
such language, and they are not remotely limited to the context of the Chevron 
doctrine and related deference doctrines. Some examples from various courts 
dealing with various interpretive propositions are collected in the margin.97 
 
 97. E.g., United States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 230 n.14 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Our dissenting 
colleague misinterprets, we believe, our precedent regarding statutory interpretation.”); Andrews v. 
United States, 441 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 2006) (observing that the Supreme Court had not 
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That the courts refer to methodology as having precedential status does 
not mean, of course, that it is always clear what precedent commands. A recent 
Fifth Circuit opinion observed that the parties disagreed over whether the 
textual canon ejusdem generis could be applied before finding that the plain 
 
interpreted the provision at issue but that “the Court did establish an important interpretative method” 
for approaching the provision), abrogated by Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008); 
Cleveland v. City of Elmendorf, 388 F.3d 522, 527 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has directed 
that exemptions from the [Fair Labor Standards Act] are to be construed narrowly and in favor of 
employees . . . .”); Miss. Poultry Ass’n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 307 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) 
(referring to “binding precedent” that governs the role of dictionaries in discerning statutory ambiguity 
under Chevron); Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 845 F.3d 925, 935 (9th Cir. 2017) (referring to 
the narrow-construction canon governing exceptions to the Fair Labor Standards Act as “binding 
precedent”), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018); EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 
1989) (“We believe that unequivocal Supreme Court precedent dictates that in cases where ambiguity 
exists . . . and there is no clear indication of congressional intent to abrogate Indian sovereignty rights 
(as manifested, e.g., by the legislative history, or the existence of a comprehensive statutory plan), the 
court is to apply the special canons of construction to the benefit of Indian interests.”); United States 
v. Phifer, 909 F.3d 372, 385 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that “[w]e are bound by” a circuit precedent 
described as holding that the rule of lenity trumps Auer deference); United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 
374 F.3d 1337, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (reading Supreme Court 
extraterritoriality opinions as “announcing, and strengthening, a generally applicable rule of statutory 
construction”); In re Lenton, 358 B.R. 651, 655 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (referring to “basic rules of 
statutory interpretation by which this Court is bound” and then discussing canons regarding ordinary 
meaning, superfluity, and limitations on use of legislative history); In re TLI, Inc., 292 B.R. 589, 593 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2003) (“We are bound by the canons of statutory construction, even though some 
may conclude that common sense requires a different, more appropriate result.”); St. Louis Fuel & 
Supply Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[W]e are bound to honor the canon 
that waivers of the sovereign’s immunity must be strictly construed.”); Ethington v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 859 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (“The only precedential case law applicable here governs 
the Court’s statutory interpretation methodology [as opposed to the substantive question, on which 
there is no precedent].”); Savko v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 800 F. Supp. 268, 273–74 (W.D. 
Pa. 1992) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis requires that I apply [a presumption in favor of 
retroactivity].”); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 495, 506 (E.D. Va. 2006) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that district courts are bound by the canons of statutory 
construction in interpreting [the Federal Rules]”); Burch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-
946V, 2010 WL 1676767, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 9, 2010) (“[Based on Supreme Court sovereign immunity 
cases], I was not free to choose the interpretation that I found to be more persuasive. I was bound . . . , 
rather, to choose the interpretation that would produce the most narrow and restricted waiver of 
sovereign immunity.”). One methodological question over which different courts disagree is whether 
the Chevron doctrine or the Indian canon of construction takes priority, but they agree that there is a 
legally correct answer to be found in Supreme Court or circuit precedent. Compare Confederated Salish 
& Kootenai Tribes v. United States ex rel. Norton, 343 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2003) (Browning, J., 
concurring) (“[The Ninth Circuit] has held that the canon of liberal interpretation in favor of Native 
Americans must give way to the Chevron rule . . . .” (citations omitted)), with Wyandotte Nation v. 
Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1204 (D. Kan. 2006) (“[T]he Tenth Circuit has 
held that the canon of construction that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of Native Americans 
may control over the deference otherwise afforded administrative agencies under Chevron.”), and Koi 
Nation of N. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 361 F. Supp. 3d 14, 49 (D.D.C. 2019) (describing the 
“binding precedent” in which the D.C. Circuit “depart[s] from the Chevron norm” in cases involving 
the Indian canon (internal quotation marks omitted)). I omit here many examples of federal courts 
stating that they are required to follow state interpretive methods. See supra note 6 (noting that 
“crossover” MP is beyond the scope of this Article). 
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language of the statute was ambiguous.98 The court stated that “[p]recedent 
from the Supreme Court is not entirely clear on this point” and “[n]either is 
precedent from our Court.”99 The court ultimately avoided the need to resolve 
the methodological question, concluding that the language was in fact 
ambiguous, so canons of construction were needed regardless.100 The key point, 
however, is that in this and many other cases, the lower courts treat the 
methodological question as the kind of thing that precedent can resolve. 101 
Indeed, the same Fifth Circuit decision quoted a previous Fifth Circuit case 
involving a different statute for the methodological proposition that “there is 
no doubt that legislative history can only be a guide after the application of 
canons of construction.”102 (That prior Fifth Circuit case has been cited more 
than a dozen times for the canons-before-legislative-history proposition, 
including by a Tenth Circuit opinion that canvassed authorities from several 
jurisdictions on that methodological question of source priority.103) 
The lower courts sometimes take things too far, perceiving binding law on 
topics where the Justices themselves do not act bound and where the Justices 
themselves would probably be surprised to see their statements taken so 
seriously. For example, in a case about recognizing a private right of action, a 
district court concluded that any possibility of finding such an implied right was 
 
 98. United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647, 658 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 99. Id. at 658 n.34. 
 100. Id. at 658. 
 101. See, e.g., Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 703 F.3d 930, 942 n.11 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e have 
not found any binding authority indicating the presumption against retroactivity should be used as a 
canon of construction [in these circumstances].”); Kisor v. Shulkin, 880 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“In a case like this one, where the 
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation and a more veteran-friendly interpretation are in 
conflict, it is unclear from our precedent which interpretation should control.”). In a recent case, the 
Third Circuit expressed its doubt that methodological propositions enjoy stare decisis effect, but it 
then nonetheless went on to acknowledge the force of the Supreme Court’s methodological 
propositions. Cabeda v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 971 F.3d 165, 171 n.4 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[S]hifting 
interpretive methodologies are not usually viewed as carrying the force of stare decisis, at least not 
when the decisions employing them do not purport to overrule past precedent . . . . We certainly agree 
that [two Supreme Court cases] provide an analytical approach we ought to follow now, but that does 
not mean the substantive conclusions reached in earlier cases have all been overruled . . . . That is not 
‘turn[ing] vertical stare decisis on its head,’ as our colleague says. It is giving necessary respect to our 
existing precedent, even when we ourselves might be inclined to decide things differently now.” 
(citation omitted)). The best reading of this case is that the court is attempting to determine how 
broadly to read a new Supreme Court methodological proposition when it conflicts with the approach 
taken in a prior circuit case that addressed a different substantive question. That is a good question, 
but it does not call into doubt the binding nature of methodology.  
 102. Kaluza, 780 F.3d at 658 (emphasis added). That prior case stated: “Only after application of 
principles of statutory construction, including the canons of construction, and after a conclusion that 
the statute is ambiguous may the court turn to the legislative history.” Carrieri v. Jobs.com Inc., 393 
F.3d 508, 518–19 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal footnote omitted). 
 103. Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.1 (10th Cir. 2016) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
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foreclosed by a then-recent Supreme Court case, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Services, Inc.,104 that concerned an entirely different field of law. The district 
court wrote: 
Exxon Mobil addressed a conflict between unambiguous statutory 
language and an unambiguous statement of congressional intent . . . . Its 
approach to that conflict dictates the outcome here . . . . In short, Exxon 
Mobil declares that it is impermissible to consult legislative history when the 
statutory language is unambiguous . . . . Exxon Mobil forecloses any 
possibility of using [the statute’s] clear legislative history to create a 
private right of action where the unambiguous statutory language creates 
none.105 
The court was probably overly hasty in discerning vertically binding precedent 
here, given the Supreme Court’s own disagreements and vacillations on the 
proper uses of legislative history. 106  Other lower courts have been more 
circumspect about finding binding law on this vexed question or have come out 
the other way.107 But, again, it is informative that courts state there is precedent 
to be found, sometimes even on the use of legislative history.108 
To be sure, one can find plenty of statements, from whatever court one 
likes, to the effect that canons are merely “rules of thumb,” not absolute rules.109 
Such statements usually mean, in context, that a canon is not determinative of 
a proper interpretation but must be considered in light of other relevant factors, 
including competing canons.110 That is simply a correct statement of the proper 
 
 104. 545 U.S. 546 (2005). 
 105. Jacobs v. Bremner, 378 F. Supp. 2d 861, 865–66 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 106. Supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 107. Thus, in Paskel v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1985), the court cited conflicting decisions 
and concluded that the correct view was that legislative history could always be considered, but “clear 
statutory language places an extraordinarily heavy burden on the party who seeks to vary it by reference 
to legislative history.” Id. at 543; see also In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1341–42 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(collecting apparently conflicting statements from the Supreme Court regarding whether legislative 
history may be consulted when the text is clear). 
 108. Addressing an analogous objection, Baude and Sachs explain that originalism can be the 
existing law of constitutional interpretation—the “official story of our legal system”—even if courts’ 
decisions often mistake the original meaning. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding 
Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1455, 1468 (2019). What matters is how courts justify their decisions, 
not whether they reach correct decisions on the chosen theory. See id. at 1468–77. 
 109. E.g., Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 325 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Like other 
canons, the antisuperfluousness canon is merely an interpretive aid, not an absolute rule.”); Silvers v. 
Sony Pictures Ent., 402 F.3d 881, 900 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile maxims 
of statutory construction may, indeed, be helpful in interpreting statutes, they are not binding.”). 
 110. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (“[C]anons are not mandatory 
rules. . . . They are designed to help judges determine the Legislature’s intent as embodied in particular 
statutory language. And other circumstances evidencing congressional intent can overcome their 
force.”). The Court is on weak ground in saying, without qualification, that canons are designed to find 
congressional intent. That is true of some canons but not all. Supra Section I.C. 
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operation of most canons, even according to the canons’ biggest boosters.111 As 
such, these judicial pronouncements are not inconsistent with the canons’ role 
as mandatory contributors to meaning, and therefore such pronouncements do 
not undermine the canons’ precedential status. 
Statements referring to canons in lawlike terms are most prevalent in the 
lower courts, but the Supreme Court makes such statements too, and not just 
in the context of the Chevron doctrine. Various substantive canons have been 
described as “holdings” or in similar terms. 112  In Ali v. Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, 113  the Supreme Court majority rejected an argument based on the 
ejusdem generis canon, reasoning (in part) that the provision at issue did not 
involve “a list of specific items separated by commas and followed by a general 
or collective term.”114 Justice Kennedy’s dissent, joined by three other Justices, 
disagreed with the Court’s result but, more interestingly, also expressed concern 
about the Court’s understanding of the canon: 
[T]he Court’s approach [to ejusdem generis] is incorrect as a general rule 
and as applied to the statute now before us. Both the analytic framework 
and the specific interpretation the Court now employs become binding on 
the federal courts, which will confront other cases in which a series of 
words operate in a clause similar to the one we consider today. So this 
case is troubling not only for the result the Court reaches but also for the 
analysis it employs.115 
The dissent’s concern is odd and overstated given that ejusdem generis reflects 
an inference of natural communication (adopted into the law) and operates as a 
matter of degree rather than an on/off switch. Other courts are therefore 
unlikely to see Ali as announcing some sharp new rule about its scope. But the 
dissent’s statement would make no sense at all if methodology were not binding 
across cases and statutes. 
The holding/dictum distinction is no longer as central to legal reasoning 
as it once was,116 so we tend not to see courts agonizing over whether a particular 
 
 111. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 51, 59–62 (2012) (explaining that competing inferences from canons must be 
synthesized through sound professional judgment). 
 112. E.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016) (describing prior cases as 
setting out a mandatory framework for applying the presumption against extraterritoriality); Arnold v. 
Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960) (“We have held that [the Fair Labor Standards Act’s] 
exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their 
application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.”). 
 113. 552 U.S. 214 (2008). 
 114. Id. at 224–25. The canon provides that a general term at the end of a list encompasses items 
of the same general kind as the listed items. POPKIN, supra note 51, at 74. 
 115. Ali, 552 U.S. at 229 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 116. David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court Decision 
Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2025–26, 2032–42 (2013); Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta 
Becomes Holdings and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 220 (2010); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal 
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tool was truly necessary to an outcome or otherwise counts as a holding under 
some method of discerning holdings. But courts occasionally employ the 
holding/dictum distinction in the context of interpretive methodology. When 
the question occurs to them, lower courts typically conclude that the Supreme 
Court’s methodological statements are holdings and thus binding. 117 Justice 
Thomas, more than his colleagues, seems to engage in debates over whether a 
methodological proposition in a prior case has really become established as a 
canon and whether it applies to statutes beyond the one that birthed it. 118 
Advocates too will characterize a canon as dictum when they seek to avoid its 
influence.119 All of this is normal behavior in a system based on precedent. 
 
Theory Lexicon 005: Holdings, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON, http://lsolum.typepad.com/ 
legal_theory_lexicon/2003/10/legal_theory_le_2.html [https://perma.cc/32N9-JZPW] (last revised 
Apr. 28, 2019). 
 117. E.g., Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 1178, 1183–84 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting an 
argument that a statement made about an interpretive presumption made by the Supreme Court in an 
earlier case was “mere ‘dicta’”). Lower courts are more likely to deem a statement dictum when it 
appears to conflict with a more definitive prior methodological proposition. See, e.g., Esquivel-
Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1024 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that “we do not read dicta in [recent 
cases] as overruling” a prior case the court understood as holding that the rule of lenity did not apply 
to civil statutes with criminal applications), rev’d sub nom., Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 
1562 (2017). Although one could take a narrow view of holdings on which methodological rulings are 
never deemed holdings, I believe the better view is that interpretive propositions do count as holdings 
at least when they are integral to the court’s ruling. See GREENAWALT, supra note 89, at 131, 211–12. 
For additional views on the holding/dictum status of interpretive propositions, see, for example, 
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1065–76 (2005); 
Frickey, Interpretive-Regime, supra note 1, at 1976; see also Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial 
Power: Constitutive and Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 535, 579 (2016) (observing that whether or not canons are “law,” they “represent longstanding 
regularities of practice within the judiciary” (emphasis omitted)). In any event, my purpose here is to 
describe how the courts treat methodology, not how they should treat it under various approaches to 
separating holdings from dicta. 
 118. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2131 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (calling an interpretive principle a “made-up canon”); B&B Hardware v. Hargis Indus., 
135 S. Ct. 1293, 1314 n.4 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (calling a presumption dictum and stating 
that “[e]ven if the Court’s description of the presumption were not dictum, no principle of stare decisis 
requires us to extend a tool of statutory interpretation from one statute to another without first 
considering whether it is appropriate for that statute”); see also United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 
310–11 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In sum, I would not 
embrace, as the plurality does, the Moskal [v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990),] formulation of this 
canon of construction [i.e., the rule of lenity], lest lower courts take the dictum to heart. I would 
acknowledge the tension in our precedents, the absence of an examination of the consequences of the 
Moskal mode of analysis, and the consequent conclusion that Moskal may not be good law.”). 
 119. E.g., Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 15–19, Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018) (No. 16-
1362), 2017 WL 5186083, at *15–19 [hereinafter Brief of Chamber of Commerce in Encino Motorcars] 
(urging the Court to reject the “supposed canon” that the Fair Labor Standards Act exceptions must 
be narrowly construed); Brief for the Appellee at 23–26, Portner v. McHugh, 395 F. App’x 991 (4th 
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2111), 2010 WL 943516, at *23–26 (arguing that the veterans’ canon was only 
recognized by the Court in dicta). 
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Admittedly, even a great many examples of courts using precedential 
language do not establish the existence of MP on their own. However, the 
existence of a great many examples (and there are more than even a long article 
can provide) of MP language is probative evidence against the conventional 
view that MP is absent from or rejected by (non-Chevron) federal 
jurisprudence.120 There is also a notable paucity of judicial statements denying 
the mandatory (though nondeterminative) force of methodological 
propositions, particularly from the lower federal courts. As shown later, one 
does not see lower courts openly embracing contradictory methodological 
propositions as if no law applied, and even the Supreme Court’s behavior in 
that regard is overstated.121 Similarly, one generally does not see federal courts 
making the categorical claim that interpretive propositions are always dicta or 
otherwise that they are categorically nonbinding. 
2. Criticizing Colleagues for Departing from Methodological Precedent 
There are many ways for a judge to criticize another judge, but one 
particularly stinging criticism is to say that a colleague has disregarded 
precedent. If methodology is precedential, then one should expect to see judges 
criticizing other judges for flouting it and to see the targets of the criticism 
denying the charge.122 The frequency of such episodes will be limited by the 
lack of clarity in the content of much of the law of interpretation, but it should 
happen sometimes. 
We do in fact see such rhetoric even from the Supreme Court, though only 
sporadically. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 123  Justice White’s partial concurrence 
criticized the majority for “depart[ing] from established precedent” in creating 
a federalism clear-statement rule rather than using the existing weaker 
presumption. 124  His criticism is noteworthy because he agreed with the 
majority’s ultimate interpretation of the statute; his dispute instead concerned 
the interpretive rules that should govern.125 And Justice Alito recently accused 
his colleagues of evading Chevron’s directive to defer to reasonable agency 
interpretations, complaining that “unless the Court has overruled Chevron in a 
secret decision that has somehow escaped my attention, it remains good law.”126 
 
 120. See sources cited supra note 1 (citing descriptions to this effect). 
 121. See, e.g., infra Sections II.A.2, III.A–B, III.D. 
 122. See HART, supra note 58, at 138 (explaining that those who have internalized a rule “refer to 
it in criticizing others, or in justifying demands, and in admitting criticism and demands made by 
others”). 
 123. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 124. Id. at 475–76, 481 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 125. Id. at 481. 
 126. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2129 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting). The majority 
contended that Chevron was irrelevant because the statute was clear. Id. at 2113. 
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In the great legislative history debate, by contrast, the Justices cite prior 
opinions blessing or disclaiming the use of legislative history, but they stop 
short of saying that the other side is flouting precedent by persisting in its 
position.127 The Justices themselves seem to regard this particular debate as 
largely unbound by precedent, at least for now. 
As usual, the lower courts furnish many examples of precedent-tinged 
rhetoric and behavior. Judges accuse colleagues of ignoring interpretive 
precedent or violating established canons.128 When faced with these accusations, 
judges on the other side do not deny that canons are binding but instead say 
that the canons are overcome by other factors in the particular case or otherwise 
disagree about the correct application of the canon.129 That is, they respond in 
the normal way one responds to appeals to precedent. 
3. Survey Responses 
We can also consider what judges say about the status of methodology in 
extra-judicial statements, and, in that regard, we should attend to the findings 
of Abbe Gluck and Richard Posner’s recent survey of several dozen federal 
appellate judges.130 Their interviews included a question about MP.131 Some 
respondents said that the Supreme Court’s methodological rulings were 
precedential, but most of the respondents appeared to believe MP does not 
exist, though they were divided on why.132 Some believed that the Court could 
 
 127. Compare Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (“Our precedents 
demonstrate that the Court’s practice of utilizing legislative history reaches well into its past. We 
suspect that the practice will likewise reach well into the future.” (citation omitted)), with id. at 622 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 
(1897) (rejecting interpretive use of legislative history)). 
 128. E.g., United States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 237 (3d Cir. 2012) (Cowan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (accusing the majority of “violating basic canons of statutory 
construction”); United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 567 
F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 2009) (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s] approach ignores an 
important canon of statutory construction.”); United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1352–
53 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s formulation of the 
extraterritoriality canon “lacks a basis in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court” and “runs contrary 
to” precedent); Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Buckley, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (accusing the majority of disregarding cases that had reformulated the 
presumption of reviewability), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
 129. E.g., Fontaine, 697 F.3d at 230 n.14 (“Our dissenting colleague misinterprets . . . our precedent 
regarding statutory interpretation.”); United Keetoowah Band, 567 F.3d at 1243 n.8 (“While the dissent 
claims that we ‘ignore’ the important canon of statutory construction that we are to consider the statute 
as a whole, we do not do so.” (citation omitted)). 
 130. Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-
Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1302 (2018). 
 131. Id. at 1356 (“Do you feel bound by whatever methods the Court uses in interpreting statutes? 
That is, are interpretive rules laid down by the Court holdings that operate as precedent in future cases 
involving statutory interpretation?”). 
 132. Id. at 1343–44. 
99 N.C. L. REV. 101 (2020) 
134 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
in principle make MP but had not gotten its act together to create a consistent 
approach, while others thought the Supreme Court lacked the power to bind 
them on matters of methodology.133 Regarding the latter response, it is notable 
that one does not see such objections to MP in judicial opinions.134 
There are several limitations on what we can conclude from the interview 
findings. As the authors acknowledge, most of the judges were not selected 
randomly.135 It appears that the sample overrepresents judges who have strong 
views or at least a particular interest in statutory interpretation.136 These are 
judges who are especially likely to do their own thinking about methodology 
and not just do what they are told. 
Perhaps more problematic is that it is hard to know how the judges 
understood MP when answering MP-related questions. The judges were asked 
whether “interpretive rules laid down by the Court [are] holdings that operate 
as precedents in future cases.”137 It may be that some of the judges think of MP 
as a system of relatively bright-line or outcome-determinative rules, which our 
interpretive regime mostly is not. Yet, as previously mentioned, that goes to 
the content of an interpretive regime, not its binding character. In addition, it 
appears that some judges who generally denied the precedential status of 
methodology then made contradictory statements, namely by accepting MP for 
Chevron and, more tellingly, for other canons like lenity and avoidance.138 The 
researchers, mindful of the respondents’ time and hoping to maintain the 
questions’ consistency, did not follow up to probe the interviewees’ 
understanding of the question or resolve the apparent contradictions.139 
B. Courts Refer to Interpretive Canons as the Sort of Thing That Could Be 
Overruled 
The doctrine of stare decisis notwithstanding, courts can overrule their 
case law.140 Indeed, the very fact that something can be overruled—and needs to 
be overruled, rather than just ignored—suggests it was binding law to start 
with.141 If interpretive methodology is the sort of thing that judges and other 
participants in the legal system speak about in terms of overruling (or 
abrogating or the like), that would tend to show that it is precedential. 
 
 133. Id. at 1345–46. 
 134. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 135. Gluck & Posner, supra note 130, at 1307. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. at 1356. 
 138. Id. at 1345–46, 1348. 
 139. Id. at 1307, 1310, 1355. 
 140. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827–28 (1991). 
 141. See John Gardner, Some Types of Law, in COMMON LAW THEORY 51, 74 (Douglas E. Edlin 
ed., 2007). 
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Courts and others do speak of overruling interpretive canons. At the 
Supreme Court level, the evidence mostly concerns deference doctrines, most 
prominently the Auer doctrine, 142  which endorses agency interpretations of 
their own rules unless they are clearly incorrect.143 The Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Kisor 144 expressly took up the question whether to overrule that 
doctrine, and the opinions in the case repeatedly used the terms “overrule” and 
“overruling.”145 
In addition, a genre of Supreme Court amicus brief has developed: the 
“canon killer” brief. This is an amicus brief devoted to arguing that the Court 
should use the case before it as a vehicle to overrule a canon governing the field 
of law in which the case arises. Canons targeted for abrogation in this way 
include the canon of narrowly construing the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”)146 exceptions;147 the presumption against preemption;148 the canon of 
narrowly construing federal removal jurisdiction; 149 and, unsurprisingly, the 
Auer doctrine150 and the Chevron doctrine.151 
The lower courts cannot overrule canons they believe the Supreme Court 
has adopted, but they do recognize that the Court may abrogate both its own 
canons and those the lower courts have previously employed. For instance, in 
its 2014 decision interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(“CAFA”),152 Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,153 the Supreme Court 
 
 142. Here, the Auer doctrine incorporates Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), 
but Seminole Rock is often overshadowed by the Auer name. 
 143. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); see also Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 
U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
 144. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 145. E.g., id. at 2406, 2408–09, 2418, 2422–23; id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 2425 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212–13 (2015) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (urging “overruling” Auer). 
 146. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.§§ 201–219). 
 147. Brief of Chamber of Commerce in Encino Motorcars, supra note 119, at 15 (stating in a section 
heading that “[t]he Court should seize this opportunity to reject the purported canon that FLSA 
exemptions must be narrowly construed”). 
 148. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15–16, 
Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008) (No. 07-562), 2008 WL 976401, at *15–16 [hereinafter 
Brief of Washington Legal Foundation in Altria Group] (“[S]tare decisis concerns should not cause the 
Court to refrain from re-examining the continued viability of the presumption [against preemption].”). 
 149. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24, Dart 
Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014) (No. 13-719), 2014 WL 2361914, at 
*24 (urging the Court to “strongly disavow the existence of a presumption against removability”). 
 150. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in 
Support of Petitioner at 9, Garco Constr., Inc. v. Speer 138 S. Ct. 1052 (2018) (No. 17-225), 2017 WL 
4022781, at *9 (arguing that Auer should be “overruled”). 
 151. Brief of Amicus Curiae Landmark Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners at 4, Cal. Sea 
Urchin Comm’n v. Combs, 139 S. Ct. 411 (2018) (No. 17-1636), 2018 WL 3435205, at *4 (mem.) 
(“[T]his case presents the optimum vehicle for overturning Chevron[.]”). 
 152. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1453, 1711–1715). 
 153. 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014). 
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held that a traditional interpretive rule—that statutes conferring jurisdiction on 
federal courts are narrowly construed—does not apply to CAFA.154 The Court’s 
interpretive dictate conflicted with the approach of most circuits, and those 
courts have accordingly treated Dart Cherokee as overruling their prior 
interpretive rules. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit read Dart Cherokee as establishing 
“binding precedent” on how to interpret CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions, not 
just as precedent on the particular question at issue in Dart Cherokee.155 As a 
result, the Eleventh Circuit repudiated its prior law that had employed the 
narrow construction canon. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit rejected an argument 
that Dart Cherokee’s statement about interpretive presumptions was dictum; 
instead, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court’s new “instruct[ions]” 
abrogated prior circuit law that had applied the narrow construction canon to 
CAFA cases. 156 Again, this circuit case did not involve the particular issue 
involved in Dart Cherokee, just the same interpretive canon. 
Lower courts also recognize, as they do in other fields of law, that they 
may not anticipatorily overrule a doctrine that the Court seems poised to 
jettison. In a recent Ninth Circuit case concerning the interpretation of an 
exemption under the FLSA, the court “recognize[d] that some members of the 
Supreme Court have questioned the soundness of the rule of narrow 
construction [of FLSA’s exemptions]. But we may not disregard the Court’s 
existing, binding precedent.”157 The Ninth Circuit’s perception that the canon’s 
future was insecure proved accurate, as the Supreme Court subsequently 
“reject[ed] this principle” of narrow construction.158 
* * * 
Statements like those above suggest that judges feel bound, compelled by 
law to apply particular methods or tools of interpretation. The statements 
accordingly provide evidence for the precedential status of methodology. Yet it 
is not particularly controversial to say that humans are sometimes mistaken, 
deluded, or insincere. Therefore, we should consider what judges actually do 
 
 154. Id. at 554. See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Jurisdiction Canon, 70 VAND. L. REV. 499 
(2017) (describing this canon’s history, justifications, and current status). 
 155. Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 912 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Applying this binding 
precedent from the Supreme Court [i.e., the Dart Cherokee case], we may no longer rely on any 
presumption in favor of remand in deciding CAFA jurisdictional questions.”). 
 156. Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 1178, 1183–84, 1183 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015); see also 
White & Case LLP v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 12, 21–22 (2009) (explaining that the court’s prior 
law on deference to administrative agencies had been superseded by later Supreme Court precedents). 
 157. Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 845 F.3d 925, 935 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted), 
rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018); see also Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 771 n.9 (3d Cir. 
2018) (stating that the court will “continue to apply the presumption against preemption” unless the 
Supreme Court “overrul[es]” it). 
 158. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018); see also infra Section III.A.2 
(discussing the overruling of the FLSA canon). 
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with interpretive methodology in addition to how they describe its status. That 
is, do they handle methodological propositions like law? Answering that 
question is the task of Part III. 
III. DO COURTS TREAT METHODOLOGY AS BINDING? 
Not only do courts talk about methodology like it is precedential law, but 
they also use methodology that way. Consistent with the criteria developed in 
Section I.E, we can divide the examination of courts’ use of methodology into 
several categories. Because open endorsement of previously rejected 
propositions of law suggests a failure of precedent, Section III.A examines the 
extent to which courts either state or refrain from stating contradictory 
operative propositions of interpretive methodology. And because precedents 
should not be ignored when they apply, Section III.B examines whether courts 
cite methodological propositions when their triggering circumstances are 
satisfied and either apply the propositions or distinguish them. Section III.C 
considers whether courts employ an overruling analysis—identifying 
exceptional circumstances, contending with reliance interests, and so on—in the 
rare cases in which they overrule MP. Section III.D considers whether canons 
act as but-for causes of interpretive outcomes. Finally, Section III.E examines 
whether appellate courts treat errors of interpretive method as significant 
enough to correct. 
A. Courts Refrain from Stating Inconsistent Methodological Propositions 
A fairly minimal requirement for the existence of MP is that courts avoid 
persistent, open disagreement on methodological propositions. MP is not very 
successful in that regard at the Supreme Court level, especially on certain 
matters, but it is quite successful in the lower courts. 
1. Supreme Court 
There are certainly domains in which the Justices openly make 
inconsistent pronouncements, the leading example being legislative history.159 
The Court also makes contradictory statements on matters like its power to 
repair legislative drafting errors. 160  Some of those contradictions are more 
apparent than real,161 but nonetheless there is genuine disagreement. There are, 
 
 159. Supra text accompanying note 89. 
 160. See Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle, supra note 1, at 386–88 (providing such examples). 
 161. For example, the Court has stated, “It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its 
drafting errors,” Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (quoting United States v. Granderson, 
511 U.S. 39, 68 (1994)), even though in other cases the Court corrects scrivener’s errors without 
textualist objections, see Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle, supra note 1, at 388. In Lamie, it was unclear 
whether the text reflected a true drafting error. See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 540–42; id. at 542–43 (Stevens, 
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as well, failures of stare decisis when it comes to particular canons. The Court 
has been erratic in its use of the presumption against federal preemption of state 
law, for example, with some Justices calling the presumption itself into 
question.162 
Perpetual dispute is a problem for MP, but the presence of some amount 
of that behavior does not rule out MP’s existence. If that were so, we could not 
have substantive stare decisis. In substantive fields, Justices sometimes adhere 
to their dissents, and not only on the most fraught issues like abortion or the 
death penalty.163 The Court often ignores supposedly governing tests and zig-
zags based on individual idiosyncrasies.164 
The use of legislative history and the judiciary’s ability to fix legislative 
mistakes are unsurprising areas for abiding disagreement among the Justices. 
The stakes are high, the contending sides are too far apart, and the disagreement 
is too deeply rooted in conflicting conceptions of the judicial role for MP to 
take hold.165 (This suggests some limits on what any system of precedent can be 
realistically expected to achieve, a point to which I return in Section IV.A.) The 
proper formulation and scope of the presumption against preemption of state 
law might, by contrast, seem easy enough to settle, which makes the failure to 
reach settlement there more damning. Then again, the Court encounters 
methodological questions in the most difficult cases, usually ones that have split 
the lower courts. And disputes over preemption implicate constitutional values, 
foundational debates over the value of text versus purposes, and political 
preferences over deregulation—not easy stuff.166 
To be sure, one could try to produce an explanation for any particular 
example of the Court’s methodological disagreement. Such apologies and 
special pleas become less convincing the more they multiply. Instead, and while 
acknowledging areas of abiding disagreement, I want to point out what may be 
surprising instances of methodological law abiding on the Supreme Court. 
Consider the evaporation of opposition to federalism clear-statement 
rules. As evidence for the claim that “Justices who disagree with an interpretive 
principle established in a particular case appear to feel unconstrained by that 
precedent in subsequent cases,” Foster cites the early experience under the 
 
J., concurring) (noting that the putative error was brought to Congress’s attention but not corrected). 
One could easily deem Lamie’s statement to be an overly broad dictum rather than a categorical bar. 
 162. E.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 621–22 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
 163. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text. 
 164. Consider, as an exhibit, the outcomes and fractured opinions in Establishment Clause cases 
like Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), and McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 
(2005), which were decided the same day. 
 165. Cf. GREENAWALT, supra note 89, at 212 (observing that lack of stare decisis on certain aspects 
of interpretive method may derive from the perceived constitutional objections to some methods). 
 166. See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the 
Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 256, 340–44. 
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Rehnquist Court’s newly minted federalism clear-statement rules.167 As Foster 
explains, four Justices dissented from the Court’s 1985 decision in Atascadero 
State Hospital v. Scanlon,168 which established a rule that abrogation of sovereign 
immunity requires unmistakably clear textual evidence, and those four Justices 
did not accede to the rule’s authority in several subsequent cases.169 That is true, 
but objections to the clear-statement rules later disappeared. As early as 1991, 
Justice Stevens, who was one of the original dissenters, joined without objection 
a majority opinion setting out the clear-statement requirement. 170  Justice 
Blackmun, another original dissenter, concurred in the judgment in that same 
case but did not write an opinion, so it is uncertain whether he still objected.171 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, the other two dissenters, were off the 
Court by the time of the case just mentioned, and Blackmun departed not much 
later, so it is hard to know whether all of the original dissenters would have 
acquiesced. Still, their objections could have been taken up by their liberal 
replacements, who did in fact continue to dissent from the analogous 
constitutional sovereign-immunity rulings that their predecessors had opposed. 
But the new liberals did not dissent from the statutory clear-statement rule of 
Atascadero. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,172 a subsequent abrogation case, 
the four dissenting liberal Justices joined the section of the Court’s opinion 
setting out the Atascadero clear-statement rule. 173  They dissented from the 
judgment because they refused to accept the precedential force of the substantive 
constitutional precedent limiting Congress’s Article I power to abrogate state 
immunity.174 
One might respond that the events just described reflect the liberals’ 
tactical concession to the reality that there were not five votes to overrule the 
clear-statement rule. Keep in mind, though, that there were not five votes to 
overrule the Eleventh Amendment precedents either, yet the dissenters 
fruitlessly stuck to their guns there.175 A tougher test would come if there were 
enough votes to change the rules. Again, though, such an overruling, if it were 
to happen, would not set methodology apart from other domains where changes 
in Supreme Court personnel lead to changes in law. Nonetheless, I would be 
 
 167. Foster, supra note 1, at 1881. 
 168. 473 U.S. 234 (1985) 
 169. Foster, supra note 1, at 1881; see Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 242. As examples of the 
subsequent dissents, Foster cites Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 790 (1991) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ.), and Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 
239–41 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.). Foster, supra 
note 1, at 1881 n.100. 
 170. Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 198, 206 (1991). 
 171. Id. at 207. 
 172. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 173. Id. at 96 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 174. Id. at 97–98. 
 175. E.g., id. at 97–99. 
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willing to wager that a future majority of liberal Justices would not overrule the 
interpretive rules, though they might overrule the constitutional limits on 
congressional power to abrogate state immunity. 
To take a more recent example of an apparent success of MP, the Justices 
who opposed the strengthening of the presumption against extraterritoriality in 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 176  reconciled themselves to the 
presumption in later cases. Thus, in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,177 
despite their disagreements on the outcome, all of the participating Justices 
signed on to the section of the opinion setting out the Morrison version of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.178 The RJR Nabisco dissenters’ argument 
was that the presumption should not apply separately to both substantive and 
remedial questions.179 That is, they were arguing over the presumption’s scope. 
What’s more, the dissenters’ argument over the presumption’s scope relied in 
part on precedents applying the presumption, not blank-slate reasons to narrow 
it. 180  This sort of argumentation—drawing on prior decisions to justify 
competing views of what the law demands—is exactly what one would expect 
in a system of precedent. 
2. Lower Courts 
If a lower court stated that dictionaries must not be considered, that there 
is a presumption that substantive legislation is retroactive, or that the Skidmore 
doctrine no longer exists, the lower court would be stating incorrect 
propositions within the governing interpretive regime. Busy lower courts can 
be expected to make mistakes, especially where briefing is inadequate or the law 
is complicated or changing. 181  Much more telling would be open and 
acknowledged departures from prevailing methodological propositions. That is 
something we do not see from lower courts to any appreciable degree in any 
context. 
What we see instead is that the lower courts pay attention to the Supreme 
Court’s operative propositions of methodology and try to follow them.182 Lower 
 
 176. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 177. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
 178. To elaborate: Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined the Court’s explication of the presumption 
in Parts II and III of the RJR Nabisco opinion, 136 S. Ct. at 2111, but Ginsburg had earlier joined Justice 
Stevens’s concurrence in which he disagreed with the majority on that issue in Morrison and Breyer had 
concurred only in the Morrison judgment, 561 U.S. at 273, 278. 
 179. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2113 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 180. See, e.g., id. at 2113 & n.2 (citing a supportive precedent and distinguishing another). 
 181. See, e.g., Diego A. Zambrano, Judicial Mistakes in Discovery, 112 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 217, 
225–26, 238 (2018). 
 182. Consider, as an example of the efforts of the lower courts, Impact Energy Res., LLC v. Salazar, 
693 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2012), in which each judge on the panel filed a separate opinion addressing, 
in part, the interaction of the sovereign immunity clear-statement rule and the presumption governing 
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courts’ obedience extends to situations in which the Supreme Court appears to 
change the rules. One might imagine lower courts taking such shifts as evidence 
that MP does not exist, but instead they faithfully seek to discern and follow 
the new rules. Consider the FLSA canon that the Court recently interred in 
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro.183 In its initial decision, the court of appeals 
followed the then-prevailing rule that the FLSA’s exemptions should be 
narrowly construed, citing a 1960 Supreme Court decision in support.184 It then 
observed that “[i]n recent years, the Supreme Court has clarified [the canon’s 
scope]” and cited two of the Court’s more recent cases that narrowed the 
canon.185 After the Supreme Court remanded the case on unrelated grounds, the 
court of appeals again deemed the canon “binding precedent” even while 
acknowledging that some Justices had continued to question the canon.186 After 
the Court finally repudiated the canon,187 lower courts recognized within weeks 
that the Court had “rejected [the] principles” calling for broad interpretation of 
the FLSA and narrow construction of its exceptions.188 Similarly, when the 
Supreme Court changed the deference regime applicable to Treasury 
Department regulations, the lower courts caught on almost immediately. 189 
Probably more common than lower courts dismissing interpretive law is 
perceiving interpretive law where there is none.190 
One situation in which we do see slippage between the interpretive 
regimes of the Supreme Court and the lower courts involves canons that the 
Court has stopped citing but has not expressly rejected. One example of a canon 
that lingers on in the lower courts after apparently being abandoned by the 
Supreme Court is the canon calling for liberal interpretation of civil rights 
acts. 191  Yet, as precedents live on indefinitely until overruled, it is not 
disobedient for the lower courts to continue citing canons that have been 
neglected of late but not overruled. 
 
statutes of limitations. Id. at 1249–50, 1253 (Lucero, J., concurring); id. at 1254–55 (Seymour, J., 
concurring); id. at 1260–61 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting). 
 183. 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018); id. at 1142. 
 184. Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267, 1271 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. 
Ct. 2117 (2016). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 845 F.3d 925, 935 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1134 
(2018). 
 187. Encino Motorcars, 138 S. Ct. at 1142. 
 188. Rodriguez v. Adams Rest. Grp., 308 F. Supp. 3d 359, 364 n.1 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 189. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React When the Supreme 
Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481, 508 (2015) [hereinafter Bruhl, 
Communicating the Canons]. 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 104–08. 
 191. See Bruhl, Communicating the Canons, supra note 189, at 521–24; see also Nina A. Mendelson, 
Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts 
Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71, 110–11 (2018) (discussing canons that the Supreme Court 
has apparently abandoned). 
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B. Courts Apply a Canon when Its Triggering Conditions Appear to Be Satisfied 
In a well-functioning system of MP, courts would not merely refrain from 
stating incorrect or inconsistent methodological propositions; they would also 
cite canons when the canons’ criteria for application are satisfied. 
Acknowledging the existence of a canon does not necessarily mean allowing it 
to control the outcome, but that initial step of recognition is needed before the 
canon can perform its role of contributing to the resolution of an interpretive 
problem. If the court does not think the canon is applicable, despite its facial 
relevance, the court should distinguish the canon or otherwise explain itself.192 
Now, there is a complication here in that the failure to mention an 
arguably relevant canon is an ambiguous signal. The court’s silence could mean 
that the court: (1) deemed the canon inapplicable (perhaps correctly so) without 
explaining why, (2) mistakenly failed to realize the canon was relevant, (3) 
refused to mention the canon in order to conceal it or avoid its effect, or (4) 
declined to mention the canon despite its applicability because the canon is not 
law. The first possibility may represent a failure of reason giving, which perhaps 
deserves criticism depending on the circumstances, but it does not undermine 
MP. The second situation is a failure of precedent, but it is the kind of failure 
one would expect in a system run by fallible humans. If this kind of innocent 
failure is particularly common with methodological questions, that would tend 
to suggest that courts may not yet think of methodological propositions as law. 
The third scenario is an evasion of precedent, which is premised on the existence 
of a duty that is being flouted. The fourth situation is the strongest evidence 
against the existence of MP. 
In some circumstances, we can exclude some of the possibilities just listed. 
For example, if there is a dissent that urges the canon’s applicability and the 
majority fails to respond, that is at least evidence that the majority was aware 
of the canon. That still does not rule out the possibility that the majority 
thought it was obvious why the canon was inapplicable or outweighed, but it is 
common for a majority opinion to respond to the major points in the dissent. 
As before, we can start with evidence from the Supreme Court, which is 
mixed, and then consider the lower courts, where canon following is the norm. 
 
 192. There are two different understandings of what it means to distinguish precedent. One 
version views distinguishing as discovering that an existing rule, taken as is, does not apply to the 
circumstances at hand. The other version portrays distinguishing as a way of subtly changing the law 
by narrowing the prior rule, albeit in a way such that the modified rule still justifies the prior case. See 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 185–86 (1979) (discussing these two interpretations of 
distinguishing precedent). The two activities blur together when the prior rule is uncertain or unclear. 
Neither activity customarily involves a stare decisis analysis. 
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1. Supreme Court 
When it comes to interpretive propositions, the Supreme Court does 
engage in the ordinary legal activities of parsing precedent to determine a rule’s 
scope and then either applying it or distinguishing it. An example comes from 
Landgraf v. USI Film Products,193 a leading case on legislative retroactivity. The 
Court was faced with the argument that a prior case, Bradley v. School Board of 
Richmond, 194  had undermined the long-standing presumption against 
retroactivity.195 The Court did not ignore Bradley or other cases on the topic, 
nor did the Court intimate that those cases did not make any law beyond the 
statutes at issue.196 The Court instead distinguished Bradley and reconciled it 
with prior cases, all in very conventional terms: 
Although [language in Bradley] suggests a categorical presumption in 
favor of application of all new rules of law, we now make it clear that 
Bradley did not alter the well-settled presumption against application of 
the class of new statutes that would have genuinely “retroactive” effect. 
. . . Our opinion [in Bradley] distinguished, but did not criticize, prior 
cases that had applied the antiretroactivity canon. The authorities we 
relied upon in Bradley lend further support to the conclusion that we did 
not intend to displace the traditional presumption against applying 
statutes affecting substantive rights, liabilities, or duties to conduct 
arising before their enactment. Bradley relied on [several precedents] that 
are consistent with a presumption against statutory retroactivity . . . .197 
The Court sought to explain why Bradley was an exception to the usual rule and, 
despite containing some loose language, was compatible with that rule. 
Presumably, the Court engaged in this discussion for the guidance of lower 
courts, and perhaps too because it felt an obligation to show the lawfulness of 
its own decisionmaking. 
In a famous recent example of distinguishing MP, the Supreme Court in 
King v. Burwell198 (the Affordable Care Act subsidies case) did not employ the 
Chevron doctrine but instead engaged in de novo interpretation of the statute.199 
Whether or not the Court’s sidestepping of Chevron was persuasive, the key 
point is that the Court felt the need to offer an explanation for doing so. That 
explanation drew on principles underlying Chevron (namely congressional 
delegation and agency expertise) and cited previous cases in which Chevron had 
 
 193. 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 194. 416 U.S. 696 (1974). 
 195. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 276. 
 196. See id. at 276–77. 
 197. Id. at 277–78 (citations omitted). 
 198. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 199. Id. at 2489. 
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been found inapplicable to questions of deep economic or social significance.200 
(Later cases then describe a “major questions” doctrine or canon, and lower 
courts argue over its scope, treating all of this—perhaps too credulously, given 
the disputes involved—like normal law.201) 
Despite cases like those above, there are numerous instances in which the 
Supreme Court does not distinguish canons (or otherwise explain why they are 
not controlling in the circumstances) but instead just ignores them. This has 
happened even when the Court was certainly aware of the canon and when it is 
hard to imagine that the Court believed the canon was so obviously inapplicable 
that no distinction needed to be made. 
Consider first the Chevron doctrine, which, recall, some scholars have put 
forward as the exceptional doctrine that does achieve MP. 202 Eskridge and 
Baer’s study of deference doctrines found that the Supreme Court often failed 
to invoke Chevron’s analytical framework when it should.203 A reanalysis of the 
data, using a different and (to this observer, better) method, found a far lower 
rate of ignoring Chevron.204 Even so, using whatever methods, some cases do 
not use Chevron’s analytical framework when they apparently should. And the 
outlook is not especially promising for future adherence to the Chevron doctrine, 
given that it finds itself besieged at the moment.205 
Other canons too sometimes go unmentioned when they ought to be cited. 
That has happened, for example, in some cases that should have featured the 
presumption against preemption, a long-standing and (one would think) well-
established canon. Yet, in PLIVA, Inc. v Mensing, 206  the majority did not 
mention the presumption against preemption despite the dissent’s heavy 
reliance on it.207 Instead, several members of the majority made remarks that 
arguably called the presumption’s very validity into doubt, though without 
 
 200. Id. (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)). 
 201. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 291 (4th Cir.) (Gregory, 
C.J., concurring), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018); id. at 328 n.3 (Wynn, J., concurring); U.S. Telecom 
Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 422 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 202. Supra text accompanying note 8. 
 203. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 75, at 1121, 1124–27 (observing the Court’s failure to cite Chevron 
when it appears applicable); Raso & Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1734, 1751, 1764 (concluding that 
deference doctrine is not precedential in part due to the Court’s failure to follow, distinguish, or 
overrule relevant cases). 
 204. Natalie Salmanowitz & Holger Spamann, Does the Supreme Court Really Not Apply Chevron 
When It Should?, 57 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 81, 81–82 (2019). Salmanowitz and Holger examined 
whether the parties invoked Chevron in the briefs rather than relying on researcher judgment applied 
to case facts. Id. at 82. 
 205. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV. 937, 
946–55 (2018) (describing recent attacks on Chevron from courts, Congress, and commentators). 
 206. 564 U.S. 604 (2011). 
 207. See id. at 627 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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expressly saying that they were doing so.208 Similarly, in Riegel v. Medtronic, 
Inc.,209 an express preemption case, the dissent relied heavily on the canon but 
the majority did not employ it or explain its absence.210 
Another example of the majority’s silence involves the traditional canon 
according to which statutes conferring federal subject-matter jurisdiction, 
especially removal jurisdiction, are narrowly construed. In a 1999 case involving 
the timing requirements for removal, one of the main points of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s brief dissent was to accuse the majority of “depart[ing] from this 
Court’s practice of strictly construing removal and similar jurisdictional 
statutes.” 211  One might have expected the majority to respond, perhaps by 
explaining that the canon had been overcome by other considerations, but the 
majority did not mention the canon at all.212 
One could cite other examples,213 but the point should be clear enough: 
despite their penchant for loquaciousness, the Justices will let canons go by 
unrebutted or unmentioned even when it appears that they are relevant and 
even when other Justices urge their importance. They do not ignore 
inconvenient canons all the time, to be sure, but it happens enough to raise 
doubts about the canons’ precedential status in the minds of the Justices. 
2. Lower Courts 
As usual, the lower courts more consistently display behaviors that one 
expects from courts bound by law. They routinely parse the scope of canons to 
see whether they apply, distinguish cases applying canons rather than ignore 
them, and otherwise subject canons to normal precedential treatment. Here are 
a few of the many illustrations that could be chosen. 
The usual rule is that grants of public land are strictly construed against 
the recipient, but the Supreme Court deemed that canon inapplicable, or 
overcome by countervailing considerations, while interpreting the Union 
Pacific Railroad Charter Act of 1862214 in Leo Sheep Co. v. United States.215 The 
 
 208. Id. at 621–22 (plurality opinion) (citing Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 234 
(2000)); id. at 642 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 209. 522 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 210. Id. at 334–35, 338 n.8, 339 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 
555 U.S. 70, 99–103 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that “the Court’s reliance on the 
presumption against pre-emption has waned in the express pre-emption context” and discussing cases 
failing to mention the presumption). 
 211. Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 357 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 212. The Court’s rather short opinion relied largely on traditional practice and pragmatic 
considerations. See id. at 351–56. 
 213. See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 937 (2016) (showing 
that opinions often do not respond to the particular canons invoked in opposing opinions in a case). 
 214. Pub. L. No. 37-120, 12 Stat. 489. 
 215. 440 U.S. 668 (1979); id. at 669. 
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Leo Sheep opinion reasoned that narrow construction of the land grant at issue 
was inappropriate in light of the Act’s great public purpose of promoting the 
development of the American West.216 Later, a district court was faced with the 
question whether the Court’s deviation from the strict-construction canon for 
public grants in Leo Sheep should extend to an 1891 statute that provided 
easements over public land for the construction of irrigation works. 217 The 
district court distinguished Leo Sheep, reasoning that “[a] canal and ditch system, 
while it serves the public interest, is not the same type of massive undertaking 
as building three thousand miles of transcontinental railroad through the 
unsettled and undeveloped American West which faced the Court in Leo 
Sheep.”218 
Opportunities for explaining, applying, and distinguishing canons arise 
with particular urgency after the Court appears to alter an interpretive canon. 
As described earlier, lower courts regarded Dart Cherokee as altering the 
interpretive regime by abrogating the presumption against jurisdiction at least 
in cases under the CAFA.219 The canon of narrowly construing jurisdictional 
statutes had been well settled in the prior law, and so, in the wake of Dart 
Cherokee, courts needed to decide whether the canon still applied to non-CAFA 
jurisdictional statutes. For the most part, courts have limited Dart Cherokee to 
CAFA cases and followed the older principle in other cases. As one court 
explained: 
The Supreme Court [in Dart Cherokee] made it clear that any 
presumption against removal [to federal court] is inappropriate in a 
CAFA action, but left open the question of whether such a presumption 
is still valid in an average removal case. 
. . . [B]ecause this lawsuit is a non-CAFA one, the rule of construing 
removal statutes strictly and resolving doubts in favor of remand is still 
in place.220 
The court sees law on both sides of the dispute: Dart on one side and the circuit 
precedent calling for strict construction on the other. The task, as it would be 
in any dispute of substantive law, is to decide which rule governs in the case at 
hand. Likewise, the Supreme Court’s strengthening of the presumption against 
 
 216. Id. at 682–83. 
 217. Overland Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. United States, No. 98 N 1149, 1999 WL 1087478, at *1, 
*4 (D. Colo. June 17, 1999). 
 218. Id. at *7 n.4. 
 219. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
 220. Erby v. Pilgrim’s Pride, No. 2:16-CV-0497-VEH, 2016 WL 3548792, at *6–7 (N.D. Ala. June 
30, 2016); see also Madison v. U.S. Bancorp, No. C-14-4934-EMC, 2015 WL 355984, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 27, 2015) (rejecting argument that the Supreme Court “recently overruled (or at least called into 
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removal”). 
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extraterritoriality in cases like Morrison required lower courts to consider new 
questions about the beefed-up canon’s application, in particular whether 
Morrison effectively overruled cases that had found certain criminal statutes to 
have extraterritorial application.221 
Even if one credits the discussion above, it is hard to prove the claim that 
the lower courts do not regard themselves as free to ignore canons when they 
do not wish to grapple with them. After all, there are lots of cases out there and 
plenty of instances in which lower courts do not cite a canon that seems relevant. 
Yet as already noted, mere failure of citation is an ambiguous signal, and, more 
than at the Supreme Court level, some failures can be attributed to mere 
oversight.222 Without claiming to make a definitive demonstration, I can point 
to several factors that militate against the existence of a widespread pattern of 
ignoring canons. 
First, although Chevron and associated deference doctrines may be 
struggling in the Supreme Court, these doctrines do seem more lawlike in the 
lower courts. Whatever private misgivings some judges may have, they regard 
Chevron as mandatory and apply it accordingly.223 They routinely use Skidmore 
as well, and when they are not sure which regime applies, they say the result 
would be the same under either rather than viewing themselves free to do 
whatever they wish.224 
Second, lower courts appear to believe that canons remain valid even when 
the Supreme Court has not cited them in years. This behavior makes sense in 
that precedents have indefinite life, persisting until overruled. The Court’s 
failure to mention a canon, even a failure that extends for decades, seems at 
most to be implicit overruling, and lower courts “are ordinarily reluctant to 
conclude that a higher court precedent has been overruled by implication.”225 
Accordingly, the lower courts continue to cite canons that the U.S. Reports 
have not seen for years.226 
 
 221. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 302–04 (D.D.C. 2011); see supra 
text accompanying notes 176–80 (describing Morrison’s bolstering of the extraterritoriality canon). 
 222. Supra text accompanying note 180. 
 223. E.g., U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 386 F.3d 977, 985 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Gluck 
& Posner, supra note 130, at 1348 (“[E]very judge we interviewed told us that he or she was bound by 
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 224. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. 
L. REV. 1443, 1464–65 (2005); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Kruger, In Search of the Modern 
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1280–81, 1301–02 (2007). 
 225. Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 226. See, e.g., Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 249 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Although 
we are aware that the Supreme Court has applied the presumption in few conflict preemption cases of 
late . . . we will continue to apply the traditional presumption [against preemption] until the Supreme 
Court provides guidance to the contrary.”); Bruhl, Communicating the Canons, supra note 189, at 520–
37 (discussing “zombie” canons that continue to be cited by lower courts). 
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Third, we can find supportive evidence of MP in macro-level patterns of 
judicial behavior. Evidence of MP emerges not only from studying particular 
rulings but also by examining aggregate patterns of how often courts, in the 
whole corpus of their output, use various interpretive tools. In particular, if 
lower courts feel obliged to follow the Supreme Court’s interpretive regime, we 
should expect, other things being equal, to see the lower courts’ mix of 
interpretive tools shift in parallel with changes in the Supreme Court’s mix of 
tools. We do in fact see such correspondences across tiers of the judiciary. In 
previous work, I studied the use of several interpretive tools at each level of the 
federal judiciary over a period of forty years. The results show that the Supreme 
Court’s use of textualist tools like dictionaries, linguistic canons, and holistic 
canons increased, and its use of legislative history decreased, beginning in 
approximately the late 1980s.227 The lower courts displayed similar shifts in 
citation behavior, though the changes were less pronounced in magnitude.228 To 
be clear, this parallel shift does not necessarily prove the causal influence of 
precedent, as other factors were influencing all of the courts, but correlated 
shifts in citation frequency are at least consistent with hierarchical influence. 
C. Courts Conduct a Stare Decisis Analysis when They Overrule Their Own 
Methodological Precedent 
A court with the power to overrule a decision is not supposed to do so 
whenever it feels differently than it did when the precedent was set. Instead, 
the court is supposed to identify special factors, such as the precedent’s 
unworkability or changed circumstances, and to consider reliance interests 
before it overrules precedent.229 In a world of MP, one should expect to see a 
stare decisis analysis before a court overrules a proposition of interpretive 
methodology.230 To be sure, it may be that courts should be more willing to 
overrule interpretive doctrines than substantive precedents, because (for 
instance) such doctrines typically engender less reliance on the part of the 
public.231 Still, if that is what courts believe, one can expect courts that overrule 
methodological propositions to explain that stare decisis is relaxed, rather than 
to ignore the analysis completely. 
Once again, we can divide our observations by court, starting with the 
Supreme Court. 
 
 227. Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 14, at 57–60. 
 228. Id.; see also Baum & Brudney, supra note 14, at 849 (showing generally similar patterns of an 
increasing use of textualist tools and decreasing use of legislative history). 
 229. See Kimble v. Marvel Ent., 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409–11 (2015). 
 230. See Foster, supra note 1, at 1877 (citing the Supreme Court’s failure to conduct such analyses 
as evidence of the absence of horizontal stare decisis for methodology). 
 231. See Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 5, at 1593–94; Raso & Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1809–
10. 
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1. Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court’s most extended treatment of overruling interpretive 
precedent comes from the recent case of Kisor. Justice Kagan, writing for the 
majority of the Court on this issue, devoted several pages to demonstrating that 
the party advocating overruling had not provided “the kind of special 
justification needed to overrule Auer, and Seminole Rock, and all our many other 
decisions deferring to reasonable agency constructions of ambiguous rules.”232 
As one would expect in a consideration of whether to overrule, the discussion 
noted the potential for unsettling the law plus the ability of Congress to reject 
or revise the deference doctrine if it wished.233 In engaging in this discussion, 
the Court implicitly rejected Justice Gorsuch’s doubts about whether stare 
decisis applies at all to “such generally applicable interpretive methods.”234 
Now, Kisor was a case about deference, and one might wonder about Kisor’s 
probative value in the broader inquiry into the existence of MP. When we look 
to other interpretive domains, we do not find extended Kisor-like analyses of 
stare decisis, at least not at the Supreme Court level (an important proviso, as 
usual). But, sticking with the Supreme Court for the moment, let me explain 
why we should not expect to observe much overruling and then mention some 
glimmers of stare decisis treatment in the nondeference case law. 
The opportunities to observe an overruling analysis for an interpretive 
doctrine or canon are rare because the need for overruling is rare. As we have 
already observed, many canons describe actual regularities of communication, 
and so it would be bizarre (albeit logically conceivable) to imagine trying to 
overrule them. Many other canons are mushy enough—in their triggering 
criteria (often, “ambiguity”), their range of application, or their weight—that it 
is hard to say that a particular decision is overruling a canon rather than (say) 
deeming the canon outweighed by another consideration. Canons can often be 
nudged this way and that without a conscientious judge feeling a need to 
“overrule.” Even in the context of substantive law, outright overruling is less 
common than narrowing, distinguishing, or other reinterpretations of 
precedent, which are not accompanied by a stare decisis analysis.235 And this is 
not even to mention disingenuous distinctions that pretend not to be 
 
 232. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019). 
 233. See id. at 2422. 
 234. Id. at 2444 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). A few years before, Justice Thomas had 
expressed similar doubts. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1214 n.1 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“Although the Court has appeared to treat our agency deference regimes 
as precedents entitled to stare decisis effect, some scholars have noted that they might instead be 
classified as interpretive tools.”). 
 235. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1862–
63 (2014). 
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overrulings, a phenomenon that is in no way limited to statutory 
interpretation.236 
Furthermore, the fact that the Court’s prior methodological 
pronouncements may have been inconsistent or unclear also tends to obviate 
the need for overruling as opposed to “clarification.” A recent example of a 
“nonoverruling” adjustment in interpretive doctrine comes from the context of 
administrative deference, where methodology is supposed to be most lawlike. 
In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States,237 the 
Supreme Court held that Chevron, rather than the older, less deferential 
National Muffler standard,238 applied to tax regulations.239 The Court did not 
understand itself to be overruling National Muffler so much as clarifying its 
previously inconsistent statements on the subject.240 If a future case were to 
revert back to National Muffler, that would be hard to characterize as anything 
other than an overruling, but that is only because Mayo Foundation self-
consciously established clear law. 
Having explained why a stare decisis analysis is going to be rare, let me 
now point to some signs of it in the nondeference cases. Some dissents from 
years past have criticized the majority for changing the interpretive rules and 
in so doing used language that invokes the usual overruling factors. For 
example, in Dellmuth v. Muth,241 in which the Court ratcheted up the clarity 
demanded of Congress to abrogate state immunity, Justice Brennan highlighted 
the unfairness of “test[ing] congressional intent using a set of interpretive rules 
. . . altogether different from, and much more stringent than, those with which 
Congress, reasonably relying upon this Court’s opinions, believed itself to be 
working.”242 The language about Congress’s reasonable reliance seems like a 
reference to stare decisis, given that reliance is arguably the most important 
limitation on overruling incorrect decisions.243 
In addition, the Court’s pattern of actions leading up to the repudiation of 
a canon generally resemble its preparations for overruling a substantive 
decision. The Court often leads up to an overruling over a period of years 
through a series of decisions in which a rule is questioned, chipped away at, 
 
 236. Friedman, supra note 91, at 6–7. 
 237. 562 U.S. 44 (2011). 
 238. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1978). 
 239. Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 57–58. 
 240. See id. at 54 (“Since deciding Chevron, we have cited both National Muffler and Chevron in our 
review of Treasury Department regulations.”). Similarly, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mead called it an 
“avulsive” change in the law—a sudden and substantial one, which calls to mind overruling—but the 
majority cast its analysis as a summation and restatement of existing doctrine, at most an accretive 
change. Compare 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001), with id. at 239–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 241. 491 U.S. 223 (1989). 
 242. Id. at 239–40 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 243. See Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1038–40 (2013). 
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distinguished, and otherwise undermined. 244  Something like this recently 
played out with regard to the canon, mentioned above, of narrowly construing 
FLSA exemptions. 245  The canon’s ultimate demise in Encino Motorcars was 
foreshadowed in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,246 where the Court 
stated that the canon “is inapposite where, as here, we are interpreting a general 
definition that applies throughout the FLSA.”247 
The Court’s next encounters with the canon were less than ringing 
endorsements. Two years after Christopher, the Court declined to apply the 
canon again, explaining that it was inapplicable because, as in Christopher, a 
definition was at issue rather than an exemption.248 By the time two more years 
had passed, Justice Thomas was referring to “the made-up canon that courts 
must narrowly construe the FLSA exemptions.”249 He noted that the Court has 
“declined to apply that canon on two recent occasions, one of which [i.e., 
Christopher] also required the Court to parse the meaning of an exemption.”250 
The reader will recall that the Christopher Court justified its decision not to 
apply the canon (which it did not call “made-up,” back then) by claiming that 
it was not interpreting an exemption. 
The axe finally fell on the canon two years later.251 This step-by-step build 
up, which matches that approach often used on endangered substantive 
precedents, would hardly be necessary if the canons could simply be ignored at 
will. 
2. Other Actors in the System 
Other actors in the system treat overruling interpretive canons as 
requiring more than simple disagreement with them. 
Courts of appeals can overrule their own precedent, though this usually 
requires action from the en banc court. There is evidence that the courts of 
appeals believe en banc rehearing is necessary to alter circuit precedent on 
matters of interpretive method, which suggests they regard it as insulated in the 
way other circuit law is insulated against overruling by panels.252 
 
 244. See Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How 
Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779, 782–91 (2012) (cataloging the Court’s use of 
such techniques). 
 245. Supra text accompanying notes 183–91. 
 246. 567 U.S. 142 (2012). 
 247. Id. at 164 n.21. 
 248. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 232 n.7 (2014). 
 249. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2131 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Supra text accompanying notes 183–91. 
 252. E.g., Mojica v. Gannett Co., 7 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 1993) (“When sitting en banc, the full 
court has the power to change general rules stated in previous cases. . . . [T]herefore, the first issue 
before us is whether the presumption against retroactivity should remain the law of this Circuit.”); 
Kisor v. Shulkin, 880 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of 
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Litigants and scholarly commentators are part of the interpretive system 
as well, and they often undertake an overruling analysis when they ask for courts 
to change the interpretive rules. As noted above, there has developed a genre of 
“canon killer” briefs that aim at urging the Supreme Court to repudiate a 
particular interpretive rule.253 Briefs targeting a canon sometimes undertake a 
stare decisis analysis, though they also sometimes express uncertainty over 
whether it is really necessary.254 
D. Precedent Acts As a But-for Cause of Interpretive Outcomes 
We come next to what some might think is the most important criterion 
for MP: whether methodology has enough precedential oomph to cause 
interpretations to come out one way rather than another. Recall weaknesses of 
this criterion noted above: Most canons and other interpretive rules are not 
supposed to dictate outcomes single-handedly but rather to contribute to 
meaning in concert with other tools. Outcome determination therefore 
underestimates precedential force. At the same time, on a more cynical view, a 
focus on outcomes could overstate precedential force if outcomes reached on 
other grounds cause canons to be employed rather than canons causing an 
outcome to be reached. For these reasons, I think it is a mistake to fixate on 
but-for causation of interpretive outcomes. 
Nonetheless, if MP exists, we should be able to identify some cases in the 
big world out there in which it appears to determine outcomes. In searching for 
such cases, it makes sense to focus on canons that are supposed to be especially 
outcome influential—such as clear-statement rules or the Chevron doctrine—
rather than canons that at best are supposed to have only slight weight—like 
rules about punctuation. To ensure that the canon is being used because the law 
requires it, not because the judge likes the outcome anyway, it makes sense to 
look for cases in which judges act against what we believe to be their 
preferences. The lower courts furnish some highly probative examples, but let 
us begin with the Supreme Court. 
 
rehearing en banc) (“This case presents an ideal vehicle for us to consider the reach of Auer deference 
when it comes into conflict with the pro-veteran canon of construction.”). 
 253. Supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text. 
 254. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of Utah et al. in Support of Petitioner, at 18, Garco Constr., Inc. v. 
Speer, 138 S. Ct. 1052 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-225), 2017 WL 4082233, at *18 (expressing doubts over 
whether stare decisis applies but also arguing that the traditional stare decisis factors support overruling 
Auer and Seminole Rock); Brief of Washington Legal Foundation in Altria Group, supra note 148, at 15–
16 (“[S]tare decisis concerns should not cause the Court to refrain from re-examining the continued 
viability of the presumption [against preemption].”); see also Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron 
Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
779, 841–43 (2010) (conducting stare decisis analysis with respect to Chevron). 
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1. Supreme Court 
As usual, it is hard to demonstrate precedent exerting strong influence on 
the Supreme Court’s merits decisions. The cases have high stakes, the legal 
materials are underdeterminate, and there is plenty of time (and cleverness) to 
reason one’s way to a congenial outcome.255 Nonetheless, there are cases in 
which we can conclude with reasonable confidence that the law of interpretation 
has caused a Justice to reach an outcome that otherwise would not have been 
reached. 
Particularly strong examples come in situations in which Justices vote 
against their ideological disposition. In Sossamon v. Texas,256 which applied a 
particularly demanding version of the federalism clear-statement rule, Justice 
Ginsburg joined the majority in holding the state exempt from liability, even 
though it was a result she probably disfavored as a blank-slate matter.257 Given 
her views on state immunity, it is reasonable to believe that she did so only 
because of the clear-statement precedent. 258  From the Court’s other wing, 
Justice Scalia was no fan of broad interpretations of employment-discrimination 
laws, 259  yet he went along with a holding that the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967260 authorized disparate-impact claims because, so far 
as it appears from his opinion, the agency’s interpretation of the statute 
deserved deference under Chevron.261 The Court was otherwise divided along 
ideological lines, and his concurrence with the Court’s liberal members was 
necessary to make a majority in favor of the availability of disparate impact. 
Similarly, in Kisor v. Wilkie, Chief Justice Roberts did not join the portion of 
Justice Kagan’s opinion that defended Auer deference on the doctrine’s merits, 
but he did join the four more liberal members to form a majority for the 
proposition that stare decisis saved the deference regime from overruling.262 
 
 255. Supra text accompanying notes 13, 87–88. 
 256. 563 U.S. 277 (2011). 
 257. Id. at 292–93. 
 258. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 305–06 (2006) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (deeming “unwarranted” the Court’s 
use of a “clear notice” rule applicable to the remedies available under a Spending Clause statute). Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent (joined by Justice Breyer) argued that the language was clear enough to satisfy the 
clear-statement requirement but did not directly challenge the clear-statement rule itself. Sossamon, 563 
U.S. at 306 (“[N]othing in our precedent demands the result the majority reaches today”). Justice 
Kagan did not participate. Id. at 293. 
 259. Johnson v. Transp. Agency Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 657–58 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 260. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 29 
U.S.C., and 45 U.S.C.). 
 261. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)) (calling Chevron “an absolutely classic 
case for deference to agency interpretation”). 
 262. 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2424 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part).  
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Chevron is the most heavily studied interpretive doctrine, and we have 
more systematic, if not wholly definitive, evidence about its ability to constrain 
the courts. It appears that Chevron does exert constraint, though imperfect, even 
on the Supreme Court. As Raso and Eskridge conclude, “deference doctrine 
matters”—though “ideology also correlates significantly with how Justices 
vote.”263 That may not sound like much, but again remember that we should 
not expect much constraint from an apex court that handles the hardest and 
most politically charged cases. 
2. Lower Courts 
We know, as a general matter, that law constrains more as one moves down 
the judicial hierarchy.264 As for interpretive methodology in particular, it is easy 
to find lower court opinions with remarks to the effect that a particular decision 
would not have been reached but for the command of a canon.265 But a skeptic 
could respond that such statements are insincere or mistaken, that the court 
would have ruled that way for other reasons. Solid, systematic evidence of 
changes in outcomes traceable to changes in interpretive methods is tough to 
come by. Even in substantive law, it is hard to observe changes in outcomes 
when a new factor is added to or subtracted from a multifactor balancing test.266 
Among other difficulties, the selection of disputes for litigation may change as 
the law changes. 
But all is not lost. We can be especially confident that a canon changed an 
outcome when the same decision maker switches their decision in the same case 
after a change in the interpretive regime. Clean breaks in interpretive rules do 
not happen often, so there are few such occasions for study. But when they do 
happen, they provide powerful evidence of MP. A few examples of cases drawn 
from such circumstances follow. 
Consider first a Seventh Circuit employee benefits case in which the court 
initially deferred to the IRS’s interpretation of a statutory provision about 
 
 263. Raso & Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1778, 1784; see also Baum & Brudney, supra note 14, at 847 
(finding ideological differences in the invocation of agency deference at the Supreme Court but 
deeming the differences “small”). 
 264. Supra text accompanying notes 14, 87–88. 
 265. E.g., EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1989) (“While normal rules of 
construction would suggest the outcome which the district court adopted, . . . unequivocal Supreme 
Court precedent dictates that in cases where ambiguity exists . . . the court is to apply the special canons 
of construction to the benefit of Indian interests.”); Amendola v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 558 F. 
Supp. 2d 459, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (refusing to follow prior similar cases in part because the cases did 
“not acknowledge that the FLSA’s exemptions must be narrowly construed against employers”). 
 266. Anthony Niblett, How Lower Courts Respond to a Change in a Legal Rule 16–17 (July 23, 
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3129865 [https://perma.cc/Q33D-CEGK] 
(showing in empirical study that it was difficult to discern shift in outcomes when one factor in a 
multifactor employee-contractor test was changed). 
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partial terminations of benefits plans.267 The IRS had set forth its interpretation 
in an amicus brief.268 The losing party sought Supreme Court review, and the 
Court summarily vacated the Seventh Circuit’s decision for further 
consideration in light of the newly issued opinion in Mead, which held that 
Chevron deference should ordinarily apply only to more formal agency 
actions.269 Under Mead, the amicus brief should be analyzed under the less 
deferential Skidmore standard and given only whatever weight its persuasive 
force merited. 270  On remand, the Seventh Circuit reversed its position. It 
explained: 
In our first opinion in this case . . . we felt constrained by [Chevron] to 
defer to the IRS’ reasonable interpretation of the partial termination 
statute. . . . Since we indicated that if we were writing on a blank slate 
we would have held differently, we now adopt the [position contrary to 
the IRS interpretation].271 
Consider next a pair of decisions from the Court of Federal Claims in a 
case concerning an application for compensation from the National Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program.272 In 2001, the court denied the application 
based on the proposition that the canon disfavoring waivers of sovereign 
immunity trumped the canon of liberally construing remedial legislation.273 A 
decade later, the same special master who had issued the prior denial reopened 
and reversed his earlier decision in light of Richlin Security Service Co. v. 
Chertoff, 274  a new Supreme Court precedent. 275  Richlin did not concern the 
 
 267. Matz v. Household Int’l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan (Matz I), 227 F.3d 971, 974, 976 (7th Cir. 
2000), vacated, 533 U.S. 925 (2001). 
 268. Id. at 974–75; Matz v. Household Int’l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan (Matz II), 265 F.3d 572, 574 
(7th Cir. 2001). 
 269. Household Int’l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan v. Matz, 533 U.S. 925, 925 (2001); Mead, 533 U.S. 
at 229–30. 
 270. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234–35. 
 271. Matz II, 265 F.3d at 574–76. 
 272. Burch ex rel. Burch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-946V, 2001 WL 180129, at *1 
(Fed. Cl. Feb. 8, 2001), granting reconsideration, 2010 WL 1676767 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 273. The court concluded its 2001 decision this way: 
I personally find some of the dissenting opinions in the 1990’s Supreme Court cases [on 
sovereign immunity] to be persuasive in arguing against the recent trend to rigorously apply 
the sovereign immunity doctrine. However, . . . I am bound to follow, instead, the majority 
opinions in those cases, which mandate strict enforcement of the doctrine, even in cases where 
the statutory scheme involves a remedial program. 
Burch, 2001 WL 180129, at *11. The court added in a footnote: “But for the sovereign immunity 
doctrine, I would likely have interpreted the statutory provision in petitioners’ favor . . . .” Id. at *11 
n.13.  
 274. 533 U.S. 571 (2008). 
 275. Burch ex rel. Burch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-946V, 2010 WL 1676767, at 
*5–6 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 9, 2010). 
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vaccine program in particular but instead involved the canon governing waivers 
of sovereign immunity in general.276 The second decision stated: 
After carefully studying the more recent Supreme Court decisions . . . I 
conclude that the applicable law concerning the application of statutory 
construction principles has substantially changed since I issued my ruling 
in this case in 2001. 
. . . . 
Under Richlin [i.e., one of the more recent cases], when faced, as here, 
with two plausible interpretations of a statute, I am no longer required 
to automatically choose the more narrow construction. Pursuant to 
Richlin, I am no longer bound to conclude that the sovereign immunity 
canon of “strict construction” automatically overrides other principles of 
statutory construction. 
This altered analysis of the sovereign immunity doctrine, in fact, changes 
the result of the statutory interpretation issue in this case.277 
A cynic might respond that the court was simply reaching the result it wanted 
to reach all along (such as ruling in favor of compensation for sympathetic 
plaintiffs). But if that is so, then the cynic needs to explain the prior decision, 
in which the court concluded that the earlier, stingier version of the sovereign-
immunity canon required it to deny compensation. The interpretive regime 
constrained at least one of the two decisions. 
One more example of a same-decision-maker-same-case switch comes 
from the long-running Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act278 
case against cigarette manufacturers. After the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Morrison, a foreign manufacturer argued that the district court’s previous 
injunction against it was no longer valid because Morrison had strengthened the 
presumption that federal statutes do not apply abroad.279 Morrison involved a 
different area of law (securities regulation), but the district court emphasized 
Morrison’s statement that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies “in 
all cases.” 280  The district court accordingly concluded that Morrison was a 
significant change in law, and it granted the defendant’s motion to modify the 
injunction.281 
 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at *7, *9. 
 278. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968). 
 279. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 280. Id. at 27 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010)). 
 281. Id. at 29–30. 
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E. Appellate Courts View Methodological Errors as Worth Correcting 
If methodology is precedential like other law, we should expect appellate 
courts to treat methodological errors and confusion as worth the effort to correct 
and clarify in ways that go beyond the substantive outcomes of particular cases. 
Indeed, if methodological rulings systematically influence the course of future 
decisionmaking (through MP or otherwise), appellate courts should care a lot 
about articulating the law of interpretation.282 We have already observed that 
appellate courts’ decisions often address and clarify interpretive issues as such, 
with an apparent expectation that they will be binding on future courts. Thus, 
in Morrison, the Court spent many pages on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and described it as a rule that should apply across all 
statutes.283 This section addresses the related matter of how the creation and 
correction of interpretive precedent affects appellate courts’ case selection and 
agenda setting. 
Cases in which the Supreme Court grants certiorari primarily to address 
methodology for its own sake arise with some frequency in the context of 
deference doctrines.284 One such case was Mead, in which the Supreme Court 
clarified the domain of the Chevron doctrine, found the case at hand outside of 
Chevron’s domain, and remanded for the lower court to apply the weaker 
Skidmore regime.285 Shortly after the Mead decision, the Supreme Court vacated 
and remanded a Seventh Circuit decision that had accorded significant 
deference to an amicus brief in a dispute involving a different agency and 
different statute than Mead.286 The Seventh Circuit’s decision to grant so much 
deference was probably incorrect in light of Mead, whether or not its ultimate 
result was still supportable. The Supreme Court’s decision to vacate and remand 
in this case underscores the Court’s trans-substantive interest in interpretive 
methodology. The Court’s action parallels one of the indications of MP that 
 
 282. Cf. THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 3 (2006) (“[L]egal reasoning . . . can have more far-reaching consequences 
by altering the existing state of legal policy and thus helping to structure the outcomes of future 
disputes.”). 
 283. 561 U.S. at 261. 
 284. E.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019) (“The only question presented here is 
whether we should overrule [Auer and Seminole Rock], discarding the deference they give to agencies.”); 
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agency’s interpretation was reasonable. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, United States v. Mead 
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Gluck discerned in the states, namely vacating cases just because of an error in 
interpretive method without more.287 
Turning to the practices of attorneys, parties sometimes petition for 
certiorari by asking the Court to resolve a methodological question. Some of 
these petitions involve Chevron or other deference regimes, of course.288 But 
petitions also assert splits over other canons and interpretive issues.289 
The Supreme Court is the prime mover when it comes to altering the 
interpretive regime, but the courts of appeals also care about clarifying the law 
of interpretation for reasons that go beyond a particular interpretation or case. 
Courts rehear cases en banc and judges advocate doing so for the purpose of 
clarifying a matter of interpretive method, such as which of two canons takes 
precedence.290 Attorneys also sometimes request that courts of appeals grant 
rehearing to address methodology.291 
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 288. E.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Cal. Sea Urchin Comm’n v. Combs (No. 17-1636), 
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against preemption applies to conflict preemption”). 
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denial of rehearing en banc) (“This case presents an ideal vehicle for us to consider the reach of Auer 
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IV. WILL REASONABLY ATTAINABLE METHODOLOGICAL PRECEDENT BE 
ENOUGH? 
The discussion above has developed an account of what MP would look 
like (Part I) and has shown that we already have quite a bit of it (Parts II and 
III). “Quite a bit” is admittedly imprecise, but the amount of MP is enough to 
be an important feature of judicial decisionmaking, especially in the lower 
courts, and easily exceeds the amount of MP that conventional thinking 
acknowledges. 
If I am right about those points, then there are some implications for the 
recent scholarly push, described at the outset, 292  to make interpretive 
methodology more fully precedential. As the following pages describe, what 
initially looks like good news about the progress of precedentialization actually 
leads to some difficult questions about the possibility of satisfying the MP 
movement’s ultimate goals. 
A. Good News and Bad News for the Movement for Methodological Precedent 
We can start with three pieces of good news for proponents of MP. 
First, the existence of MP in the federal courts shows that getting them to 
treat methodology as binding law is not a hopeless pipedream. MP exists—and 
not just in a few states in certain years but in the federal courts too, especially 
in the lower courts, and not just (or even particularly) for the Chevron doctrine. 
Second, environmental conditions within the judiciary favor the continued 
precedentialization of methodology. Courts are becoming more self-conscious 
about interpretive method, regarding it as a law-governed activity. 293 Legal 
education deserves some credit for this developing self-consciousness, for a 
generation of law students has now been trained since the revival of statutory 
interpretation as a field of widespread study and teaching.294 These graduates 
take their knowledge to judges’ chambers as clerks, and some are now old 
enough to be judges themselves. Although I believe the Gluck and Posner 
survey underestimates the prevalence of MP,295 it does suggest that “younger” 
judges—roughly, judges educated after the 1980s revival of textualism—are 
more attracted to canons and interpretive formalism than are judges of the 
 
 292. Supra text accompanying notes 2–3. 
 293. See Phillip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory 
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 295. See supra Section II.A.3. 
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previous generation.296 Attraction to canons and formalism is not the same 
thing as adherence to MP, but they are compatible and reinforcing impulses. 
A broader environmental factor that favors MP is a longer-term shift 
toward expansive notions of precedent in the lower federal courts. The lower 
courts increasingly view the Supreme Court as a generator of rules to be 
followed, and they rarely deem the Court’s words to be nonbinding dicta.297 
With regard to their own circuit law, the federal courts of appeals apply a 
peremptory law of the circuit that is established by one ruling, rather than an 
older notion of precedent that accretes over time as a proposition becomes 
better and better established.298 
The third piece of good news for fans of MP is that certain doctrinal spaces 
seem ripe for relatively easy precedentialization. Consider rules that set 
priorities among interpretive sources or canons. Although it is hard to imagine 
the Supreme Court adopting a complete order of operations, less ambitious 
priority rules aimed at specific topics or particular tools are easier to settle. 
Which comes first: lenity or legislative history in a criminal case? The Indian 
canon of construction or the Chevron doctrine? The Supreme Court has 
sometimes hesitated to establish firm rules on such matters,299 but these are the 
kinds of questions the Supreme Court or other courts could answer in an easily 
articulable and quotable way that future courts would regard as binding. To be 
clear, I am not advocating these moves, just pointing out their doctrinal 
tractability. 
The Supreme Court could also generate more MP around substantive 
canons. One way to do so is by clarifying whether certain long-neglected canons 
still exist at all. The Court has lately repudiated some substantive canons, and 
the lower courts took notice. 300  The Court could also answer categorical 
questions of scope (for example, whether the presumption against preemption 
applies at all to express preemption clauses). Lower courts would treat these 
rulings as law as well.301 
Now for the bad news for the MP program. The existence of rather a lot 
of MP leads to a troublesome question. Namely, why does the system fail to 
exhibit even more MP than it already does? After all, MP is sitting right there. 
I see two likely answers to the question, and neither of them bodes well for the 
forward march of MP. 
 
 296. Gluck & Posner, supra note 130, at 1311–12. 
 297. Klein & Devins, supra note 116, at 2025–26, 2041–42. 
 298. See supra text accompanying notes 19–21. 
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 300. See, e.g., supra Sections II.B, III.A.2 (discussing Encino Motorcars and the rejection of the 
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 301. See supra Section II.B (discussing Dart Cherokee and the narrowing of the jurisdictional canon). 
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First, many aspects of interpretive methodology have little capacity for 
further specification. The areas for progress identified above involve the 
resolution of such matters as the admissibility of a source, the validity of a canon, 
priority between canons, and categorical questions of scope. All of those matters can 
be distinguished from questions of a source’s weight (how powerfully does the 
source contribute to meaning) and noncategorical matters of scope (for example, 
how ambiguous does text have to be before canon X applies?), neither of which 
is susceptible of precise specification. Consider canons of word association like 
ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, both of which tend to narrow down general 
terms to fit the particular context at hand.302 The force of such rules is highly 
sensitive to context, and, even when they are being handled sincerely, it is hard 
to generalize about when they will prevail. The law has adopted them as 
principles of legal interpretation, and the law plausibly could specify their 
priority vis-à-vis other tools (for instance, “syntactic canons come before 
legislative history”), but the law can do little to specify their exact weight or 
contours. 
Second, and worse, certain methodological matters are too controversial 
and consequential for MP to take hold. The great legislative history debate 
provides the leading example of a high-stakes methodological controversy, 
though controversies over fixing likely legislative oversights (apart from pure 
typographical errors) are good examples too.303 Part of the point of precedent 
is to generate agreement despite conflicting individual first-order preferences, 
but if preferences are too deeply held and too consequential to consider giving 
them up, the project cannot get off the ground.304 Put differently, precedent is 
most useful for matters that are somewhat contentious, such that stare decisis is 
needed, but not so contentious that achieving settlement is impossible. Because 
some disputes over interpretive method derive from deep disagreements over 
the judicial role and the nature of representative government, we cannot expect 
judges to acquiesce in what they regard as usurpation of legislative power or 
subversion of democracy. 305  Or at least we cannot expect Supreme Court 
Justices to so acquiesce, even if lower courts would be inclined to obey any 
doctrine that the Court announced. 
Of course, judicial preferences can change over time, especially with 
changes in personnel. If the ideological disagreements on the Supreme Court 
weaken, the domain of MP may expand to some matters that previously proved 
too contentious. The departures from the Court of a committed supporter of 
legislative history and other intentionalist tools (namely Justice Stevens) and 
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its most uncompromising opponent of the same (the late Justice Scalia) may 
lead to an era of somewhat greater consensus. The Court’s newer liberal 
members, Justice Kagan in particular, are less supportive of the use of legislative 
history than Justice Stevens was, so the Court’s left wing may be ceding some 
ground on that particular battlefield. 306  If the Court’s newer conservative 
Justices showed a willingness to moderate their demands a bit, they might be 
able to achieve a settlement on mostly favorable terms.307 
Still, although ideological homogeneity may create the semblance of MP, 
the settlement of highly consequential matters may not survive the loss of the 
homogeneity that sustained it. The recent history of the Michigan Supreme 
Court provides a cautionary example. Textualists gained a narrow majority and 
established what purported to be a binding regime of textualism.308 But the 
minority did not fully buy in, and the court’s commitment to the textualist 
revolution has waxed and waned according to the election returns.309 At the 
federal level, the Chevron doctrine, once presented as the example of the 
possibility of MP, faces a similar test as committed opposition to it grows.310 
To sum up: Where doctrinal structures lend themselves to regularization 
and ideological stakes are low, we often have MP or can realistically foresee 
getting more of it. But in areas that lack one or both of those features, MP is 
unlikely to take hold. As the next section explains, proponents of MP are more 
likely to linger over the bitter than the sweet. 
B. Why Methodological Precedent Is Likely To Disappoint Its Proponents 
The MP we currently have is meaningful. MP means that it is error to 
ignore a canon when its conditions for applicability are satisfied. 311  Or to 
continue to use a canon of narrowly construing exceptions to the FLSA.312 Or 
to fail to draw inferences (not conclusive, to be sure) from the use of different 
language in different parts of a statute.313 Or to use the canon of narrowly 
construing federal jurisdiction when the CAFA is involved.314 Or for a district 
court to employ the Chevron doctrine and the Indian canon of construction in 
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the wrong order, where the relevant circuit has established a prescribed order.315 
And so on, for a hundred different methodological propositions. Lower courts 
may not do such things without breaking the law. Even the Supreme Court is 
coming to believe that it may not, lawfully, discard its own methodological 
propositions without overruling them.316 And further precedential expansion is 
reasonably achievable, in certain areas. 
Yet despite MP’s progress, my sense is that it has not registered to most 
observers, maybe especially to those who support MP as a normative matter. 
One factor that probably explains a lot of the dissatisfaction is the usual focus 
on the Supreme Court and its biggest methodological dispute, the enduring 
debate over the use of legislative history. But even if one abjures the unhealthy, 
distorting focus on the Supreme Court and its most contentious debates, I 
suspect that those who come to recognize the full extent of actually existing MP 
will not find it as gratifying as they expected. If we have MP already, why does 
it feel so unsatisfactory? 
This answer necessarily enters the realm of speculation, but the cause of 
dissatisfaction may be that MP has not delivered on predictability in outcomes, 
the felt absence of which provides much of the motivation behind the push for 
MP.317 To some extent this dream is simply unachievable, especially at the 
Supreme Court level, which generally gets most (too much) of the attention. 
There, the law is often vague, conflicting, or otherwise underdeterminate.318 As 
one moves down the hierarchy, relatively fewer cases are hard enough or fraught 
enough to generate disagreement. In that sense, outcomes are very predictable 
on the whole, and part of the credit for that belongs to precedent, both 
methodological and substantive. But predictability is scarcer in the hard cases 
that make it to the top. 
Even more dispiriting than the unrealistic goal of predicting outcomes in 
the hardest interpretive cases, though, is the surprising lack of consistency when 
it comes to which tools are even employed. In a study of five recent years’ worth 
of statutory interpretation cases that eventually made it to the Supreme Court, 
I found that it was rare for courts at different levels of the system to cite the 
same tools in their decisions in the very same case.319 That is, the Supreme 
Court might decide a case based on dictionaries and a substantive canon when 
neither of those sources was cited in the court of appeals, which might instead 
have used the Chevron doctrine and a different substantive canon. Another 
recent study, Lawrence Baum and James Brudney’s examination of several 
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decades of labor and employment cases, found a similar lack of overlap in tools 
used by different courts within the same case.320 Further, they found that the 
rate of co-reliance on sources declined a bit from the Burger Court to today.321 
These findings are bad news for the hopes for a predictable interpretive regime 
orchestrated by the Supreme Court. 
The difficulty with achieving predictability is that it requires not only a 
settled approach to interpretation but that the settled approach have particular 
contents. “Always rule for the defendant in criminal cases” is a method that 
generates highly predictable outcomes. But as that example suggests, the most 
predictable regimes are often unpalatable. 
Some palatable regimes might be able to increase predictability in terms 
of which tools are used, but difficulties will remain. Consider a tiered system 
such as Oregon’s PGE framework, which put text in the first tier and permitted 
recourse to lower-tier sources only if the text was unclear.322 That system, while 
it lasted, actually did tend to reduce citations of legislative history,323 and in 
that limited sense it increased the predictability of the interpretive toolkit. (It 
is not clear if it improved predictability more broadly.324) One major downside 
of such tiered approaches, however, is that the predictability of their toolkit 
stems from their use of lexical priority, which means that sources or tools from 
the next tier may not be used at all unless the previous tier’s analysis is 
inconclusive.325 As a theoretical matter, lexical prioritization involves difficult 
tradeoffs between decision quality, decision costs, and other virtues. 326 
Consider the situation in which a second-tier canon or source favors 
interpretation X overwhelmingly but the first-tier tool favors interpretation Y 
by only the minimally sufficient amount to preclude moving to the next tier. 
Interpretation Y would win in a system of lexical priority, even if the overall 
balance of considerations favors X. Whether accepting the lower-quality 
decision is worth it depends on various features of the decisionmaking 
environment, which can vary across courts and time.327 
And that is when the system of lexical priority is being followed sincerely! 
In a tiered system, much rests on the gateway finding—often described as 
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“ambiguity”—that permits the interpreter to move to the next stage. These 
sorts of vague, yet consequential, doctrinal hinges are a recipe for evasion and 
manipulation. And that, of course, bodes ill for predictability or quality or both. 
CONCLUSION: BACK TO CONTENT 
Following MP is much like following other precedent. And, like other 
forms of precedent, we find more of it in the lower federal courts than in the 
U.S. Supreme Court. The lower courts refer to the “binding” force of 
methodological propositions and treat canons as mandatory contributors to 
meaning. Their decisions change when interpretive precedent changes, such as 
when the Court modifies or retires a canon. The evidence from the Supreme 
Court is naturally more mixed, but the Court surely engages in more MP-like 
behavior than the conventional wisdom supposes. Although it is true that the 
Court sometimes ignores relevant canons, it also parses their scope, 
distinguishes them, and occasionally overrules them or reaffirms them, as it 
does with substantive precedents. And although the Court has been unable to 
coalesce around a single position on legislative history or a shared view of the 
ultimate goals of interpretation, in many areas the Justices appear to feel bound 
to accept and apply canons they do not prefer. 
Where does the reality of actually existing MP leave us? As far as 
normative theory goes, it should direct us to debates over content—that is, what 
the courts’ methods should be. Of course, that is what the normative literature 
on statutory interpretation has mostly been doing all along, both before and 
after the MP program arose. This does not mean we should just carry on the 
interpretation debates in their status quo ante. Instead, we should engage in 
normative debate that is informed by the potential for precedentialization. 
Some of the highest-stakes matters of interpretive theory are likely to resist 
MP, at least in the near term. But there are other areas where the temperature 
is low enough to allow the bonds of precedent to form. And, within those areas, 
certain types of changes in the interpretive regime are more precedentializable 
than others. For example, priority rules and order of operations are plausible 
growth areas for MP. Fans of MP, and fans of formal rule-of-law values like 
consistency and uniformity, should direct their attention to such matters. And 
all should understand that the stakes of resolving those methodological matters 
are higher than the stakes of any particular case, because resolutions of these 
matters can stick, especially in the lower courts. So: What should come first, the 
Chevron doctrine or the Indian canon of construction? In criminal cases, 
legislative history or lenity? Or is the best answer that there is no mandatory 
priority? That can be binding law too, though law that the proponents of MP 
are unlikely to favor. 
Over a longer horizon, we can imagine plausible futures in which the 
Court adopts a macro-level order of operations, such as “modified textualism” 
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or some other form of tiered methodology in which text comes first and 
subsequent tiers of sources (like legislative history and substantive canons) are 
used only if the preceding tier’s sources are inconclusive.328 Would that be an 
improvement?329 
These are good normative debates to have. Deciding which sources and 
canons are admissible, under what circumstances, and in what order—those 
things matter, especially in the law-abiding lower courts, and they matter even 
more in an era when methodological decisions can attain the full force of law. 
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